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THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX & INTERNATIONAL LAW
ADAM CHILTON & DUSTIN TINGLEY*

In the second half of the twentieth century, the number of
international courts and tribunals available to help settle
transnational disputes exploded. During the same period, there
was also a proliferation of research in social choice theory that
illustrates a range of ways that the aggregation of preferences and
judgments can create inconsistent results. This research has
become an increasingly important tool for legal scholars who seek
to understand the strategic constraints that shape judicial decisionmaking. One important insight gained from this scholarship is the
existence of the “doctrinal paradox.” The doctrinal paradox shows
that under certain conditions, the decision-making processes of
multi-member courts can be indeterminate because the outcomes
of cases change based on the way that the judges choose to
aggregate their judgments. In other words, the same distribution
of opinions among a panel of judges may result in either party A or
party B winning a particular case, depending on the method that
the judges use to reach a final decision. The doctrinal paradox thus
not only creates outcomes that may appear logically incoherent,
but since it results in decisions that are at tension with the
precedent they create, it also threatens the integrity of the
development of law more broadly.
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This Article is the first to explore the important implications
that the doctrinal paradox has for international adjudication. To
do so, we have undertaken one of the first efforts to compile
comparative data on the decision-making procedures and dissent
rates of international courts. By coupling this information with
insights from international relations and international law, we
argue that there are unique features of international courts and
tribunals that affect the causes and consequences of the doctrinal
paradox. Specifically, since international courts are uniquely
vulnerable to having their decisions ignored by litigants but still
provide an essential avenue for the development of the corpus of
international law, the impact of paradoxical decisions can be
magnified. We also discuss examples where the doctrinal paradox
can arise and has arisen during the course of international
adjudication. Finally, we argue that the designers of international
legal institutions should explicitly consider the tradeoffs associated
with maintaining flexible policies versus adopting a fixed
judgment aggregation mechanism.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.

3.

4.

Introduction ..................................................................................69
Judgment Aggregation Theory ..................................................74
2.1. Social Choice Theory and Judgment Aggregation ...................75
2.2. The Doctrinal Paradox ............................................................79
2.3. The Doctrinal Paradox in Practice ..........................................83
2.4. The Options for Avoiding Indeterminacy ...............................86
Causes & Consequences of the Doctrinal
Paradox in International Law ....................................................90
3.1. Situating Judgment Aggregation in International
Adjudication ............................................................................93
3.2. The Conditions Necessary for the Dotrinal Paradox &
International Adjudication .....................................................98
3.3. Resolving Indeterminacy in International Adjudication ......105
3.4. The Consequences of Indeterminacy in International
Adjudication ..........................................................................108
The Paradox During International Adjudication ..................112
4.1. Strategy for Locating the Doctrinal Paradox
Internationally ......................................................................113
4.2. Permanent International Courts ...........................................115
4.3. Scientific Decision-Making by International Panels.............118

Ͳʹ

Ǧ  ȋ ȌȋȌ

ʹͲͳʹȐ

DOCTRINALPARADOX

ͳȀͳͺȀʹͲͳ͵ͷǣʹͶ

ͻ


5.

6.

4.4. International Investment Arbitration ...................................123
Resolving the Paradox in International Adjudication ..........127
5.1. Flexible Aggregation Procedures in International
Adjudication ..........................................................................128
5.2. Context-Sensitive Voting in International Adjudication .....131
5.3. Issue-Based Voting in International Adjudication ...............133
5.4. Outcome-Based Voting in International Adjudication .........135
Conclusion ..................................................................................137
1.

INTRODUCTION

In the latter half of the twentieth century, the international
community created a dramatic number of new international
forums to resolve transnational disputes. Today, there are more
than two dozen permanent courts and more than one hundred
judicial bodies and procedures that resolve legal disputes through
international adjudication.1
These courts, tribunals, and panels have also played an
increasingly important role in addressing a range of critical
international issues that had previously been resolved through
diplomacy and politics alone.2 As the frequency and the stakes of
international adjudication have increased, scholars and
practitioners have wisely leveraged the theoretical insights from
different fields of scholarship in order to improve the efficacy of
the international legal project and thus put its operation, not just its
mandate, on a clearer conceptual foundation.
One field of research that has rapidly expanded in conjunction
with the proliferation of international courts and tribunals is social



1
See Cesare P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of International Rule of Law Institutions,
2 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 241, 241–42 (2011) (documenting the existence of 142
international “bodies and procedures” that are part of the effort to “control[]
implementation of international law”).
2
See, e.g., Erik Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments:
Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 61 INT’L ORG. 669, 670 (2007)
(“[S]cholars have argued that the rulings of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
have fundamentally transformed the European Union (EU) legal system, that
decisions by the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body have
amounted to judicial policymaking, and that judgments by the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) have
helped to establish a substantial new body of international law.”) (footnotes
omitted).
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choice theory.3 This field of scholarship seeks to understand the
properties of decision-making in group settings. The key insight of
this research is that the decision-making processes of individuals
who have formed collective entities—whether as corporations,
juries, or panels of appellate courts—are different from the
decision-making processes of an individual.4 This insight has
profound implications for many fields of scholarship and has been
increasingly incorporated into legal theory.5 By thinking of judges,
juries, and legislatures as collective, and not singular, entities, it
has been possible to elucidate the strategic considerations that
constrain decision-making in legislative and judicial bodies.6
Social choice theory has thus successfully been deployed to help
explain everything from the evolution of criminal law to
constitutional interpretation on the Supreme Court.7


3

Writing more than twenty-five years ago, Amartya Sen stated that “[t]he
number of books and papers published in formal social choice theory has now
certainly exceeded a thousand, the bulk of it coming in the last decade and a half.”
Amartya Sen, Social Choice and Justice: A Review Article, 23 J. ECON. LITERATURE
1764, 1765 n.7 (1985).
4
See generally CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY,
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS 4 (2011) (defending the existence of
group agency as a phenomenon separate from, though reconcilable with,
“methodological individualism”).
5
See id. at 1 (“The issue of group agency lies at the heart of social-scientific
and economic methodology and of legal and political philosophy.”). See also
Adrian Vermeule, Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, The Supreme Court
2008 Term, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2009–2010) (arguing that although the topic has
not yet been fully explored, “[p]ublic law is rife with system effects”). See
generally MAXWELL L. STEARNS & TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND
APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009) (describing public choice theory’s rise in prominence
as due to its providing “means of closing the gap between the normative
prescriptions . . . [of] the traditional economic analysis of law . . . [with] the
observed realities of legal practice and doctrine”).
6
See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 1, 20–22 (2009) (arguing that the doctrinal paradox may temper the
claimed benefits of the “wisdom of the crowds” effect that comes from having
many judges decide an issue). Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS
PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 16–19 (2006) (exploring the successes and recommending
different methods of aggregating the knowledge of “many minds”).
7
See, e.g., LEO KATZ, WHY THE LAW IS SO PERVERSE 6–9 (2011) (arguing that
social choice theory can help to explain a number of peculiar features of our legal
and criminal justice system); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court,
Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law and Political Science, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 352, 376 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court should be thought
of as a “they” and not an “it”).
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In the context of multi-member courts, one contribution of
social choice theory that has been particularly useful is the
identification of the doctrinal paradox.8 This paradox is that when
a group of judges has to make decisions in a case that involves
several connected propositions, and they have divergent views on
how the case should be decided, the outcome of the case can
change based on whether the court chooses to aggregate its overall
judgment on how the case should be disposed of; or, instead,
chooses to aggregate its judgments on each individual proposition.
In other words, the same facts, law, and distribution of viewpoints
can result in either party winning the case depending on which
way the judges choose to count their votes. Although the paradox
may be rare, it is more than simply a theoretical possibility.
Research on the Supreme Court has shown that the decision on
how to aggregate votes in the face of the doctrinal paradox may
have altered the result “in well over one hundred cases, and it
would certainly have led to different results in twenty or thirty
[S]upreme [C]ourt cases.”9 When the doctrinal paradox does
occur, it not only creates a logically incoherent decision in the
instant case, but also creates a broader problem for the integrity of
the development of law because the outcomes of prior cases are
incompatible with the reasoning about how individual issues
should be viewed.10 The result is that the paradox risks creating
law that is not “consistent, interpretable, [or] action-guiding.”11 It
also illustrates the mistake of viewing collective decision-making
bodies as singular, rational agents.12 Despite these ramifications, to
date, existing scholarship has focused on either discussing
hypothetical examples or high profile cases that arose in appellate
litigation in the United States.


8

Philip Pettit and others have also more recently referred to this
phenomenon as the “discursive dilemma.” For further discussion on this point,
see infra text accompanying note 47.
9
John M. Rogers, “Issue Voting” by Multimember Appellate Courts: A Response
to Some Radical Proposals, 49 VAND. L. REV. 997, 999 (1996).
10
See generally Christian List & Philip Pettit, On the Many as One: A Reply to
Kornhauser and Sager, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377, 377 (2005) (citing RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986)) (discussing the “integrity challenge” presented by the
doctrinal paradox).
11 LIST & PETTIT, supra note 4, at 15.
12 See id.
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Given this limited emphasis in the existing scholarship, the
unique implications that the doctrinal paradox has for
international adjudication have been almost entirely ignored by
scholars and practitioners. Our project aims to be the first to
provide a systematic look at the implications that this important
insight from social choice theory has for the design and decisionmaking procedures of international courts and tribunals. To do so,
we have undertaken what are, perhaps, the first efforts to compile
comparative data both on the formal decision-making procedures
of the permanent international courts, and on the rates that
international judges on a range of courts file dissenting and
concurring opinions. Using this data, we demonstrate that policy
makers and judges have not established procedures regarding
what should happen when a decision in a case has two justifiable
results, even though the structural features that lead to the
doctrinal paradox are present in international courts. Moreover,
we will argue that when the doctrinal paradox does occur, the
consequences are magnified. This is both because states are able to
refuse to comply with international decisions and because
transnational legal decisions play an important role in establishing
the corpus of international law. Paradoxical decisions convey
unclear messages to other courts and legal actors. As a result, the
doctrinal paradox is not just an interesting theoretical problem—it
is an important source of indeterminacy that should be considered
by the practitioners and policy makers who design the institutions
that facilitate international adjudication.13
Our project makes two important contributions. First, we hope
to bring the doctrinal paradox, and more broadly, the problems of
judgment aggregation, to the attention of scholars and practitioners
of international law. This may help the contributions from
research on judgment aggregation to be taken into consideration
by the designers of new international courts and tribunals and by
judges on existing courts, who should consider whether to take the
proactive step of adopting a clear position on judgment
aggregation mechanisms. Second, we hope to launch a discussion
on how distinct features of adjudication and decision-making in



13 It is worth noting that indeterminacy is what results when it is unclear how
a collective body will act given a set of preferences of judgments. See JON ELSTER,
EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 413–
419 (2007).
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different settings can influence the cause and consequences of the
doctrinal paradox. Specifically, we propose that scholars seek to
explain the mechanisms that lead to the doctrinal paradox in
different contexts and the implications that this may have for
adjudication. By focusing on the distinct characteristics of different
forms of adjudication, policy makers and institutional designers
may be more likely to take the risks of indeterminacy in decisionmaking seriously, and to consider fully the tradeoffs of formal
judgment aggregation mechanisms versus more flexible
approaches. We believe that both of these contributions have
important theoretical and practical implications.
With these goals in mind, our paper proceeds in four parts. In
Section 2, we explain the evolution of social choice theory, and
then discuss the relevance of this research to the practice of
adjudication by multi-member courts. In Section 3, we argue that
it is important that the insights from judgment aggregation theory
generally, and the doctrinal paradox specifically, be applied to
international adjudication. To do so, we canvass the official
policies dictating how the judges on permanent international
courts and tribunals are to resolve cases, which allows us to
illustrate how certain features of international adjudication help to
pave the way for occurrence of the doctrinal paradox.
Additionally, we analyze how the features of international legal
institutions can magnify the consequences of the doctrinal paradox
because states have the power to refuse to comply with adverse
decisions; we discuss how the mixed messages sent by the
decisions can potentially be more problematic to the growth of
international law than they would be in a domestic setting. In
Section 4, we explore how the doctrinal paradox has arisen in the
course of international adjudication and how it could occur in the
future. Specifically, we describe how the doctrinal paradox has
occurred in the European Court of Human Rights and how it may
appear in other contexts like international panels making scientific
judgments and during international arbitration. In Section 5, we
turn to considering the potential ways to resolve the paradox.
Given the considerable variation among international courts and
tribunals, we do not attempt to prescribe one solution. Instead, we
discuss how the approaches available to resolve the paradox
present unique tradeoffs in international contexts. It is our
ultimate position that there are justifiable reasons for taking a
number of different approaches, but that judgment aggregation
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methods should be an important consideration when the policies
and procedures of international courts are established.
2. JUDGMENT AGGREGATION THEORY
In the second half of the twentieth century, a massive literature
in social choice theory emerged that sought to understand how
decisions are made in group settings.14 The core of this literature
focuses on how groups aggregate their preferences, focusing
specifically on when groups have to issue a decision on what they
believe to be true or false. One strand of this literature takes this
premise further by studying how groups make decisions where
there are multiple underlying premises that must be considered.
Since one important purpose of the court system is to make trueor-false decisions on a series of claims or propositions, this analysis
has clear implications for legal scholars and practitioners. To date,
the legal theorists who have tried to arbitrage ideas from judgment
aggregation theory have primarily focused on how they can help
to explain and inform the way that adjudication is conducted in
appellate litigation in the United States. As a result, it is our hope
to explain the importance and relevance of the problems raised by
judgment aggregation theory before turning to examine how the
failure to addresses these issues can create harms that are unique
to and accentuated in adjudication in international settings.
This Section proceeds in four parts. First, we explain existing
research on judgment aggregation theory. Second, we turn to
examining one specific problem of judgment aggregation, the
doctrinal paradox. This paradox is strongly associated with
adjudication by multi-member courts, and is thus of particular
relevance to the proceedings at international courts and tribunals.
Third, we discuss several high-profile cases where the doctrinal
paradox has occurred in appellate litigation in the United States.
These examples help to illustrate both that the paradox is more
than simply a theoretical possibility, as well as how judges have
altered their decisions in inconsistent ways to avoid paradoxical
results. Finally, we consider the drawbacks associated with both of
the judgment aggregation methods available to resolve cases when


14

Christian List, The Theory of Judgment Aggregation: An Introductory Review,
187 SYNTHESE 179, 179 (2012) (“The theory of judgment aggregation is a growing
interdisciplinary research area in economics, philosophy, political science, law
and computer science.”).

Ͳʹ

Ǧ  ȋ ȌȋȌ

ʹͲͳʹȐ

DOCTRINALPARADOX

ͳȀͳͺȀʹͲͳ͵ͷǣʹͶ

ͷ


the doctrinal paradox occurs. Although they have previously been
debated in the domestic context only, the drawbacks associated
with both methods have the potential to manifest themselves in
international law and, as we will discuss later in Section 5, may
even be worse.
2.1. Social Choice Theory and Judgment Aggregation
The field of social choice theory grew out of the important
contributions of Condorcet and Arrow.15 In 1785, the Marquis de
Condorcet published a now-famous essay that demonstrated that
when there are at least three people making a decision together
over at least three options, there are conditions under which it is
impossible for a stable majority to be reached in favor of any of the
options.16 For example, if three people were deciding among
options A, B, or C, it could be the case that if each person were to
rank their preferences, then it could result that A is preferred to B,
that B is preferred over C, but that C is preferred over A.17 What
then is the rational and fair ordering of the options for our group of
three? There is none, according to Condorcet; none of the options
is preferred by a majority to any of the other options. The
important implication of the Condorcet paradox—also known as
the voting paradox—is that the principle of transitivity, “which
operates as a basic rationality assumption for individuals, cannot
be assumed for groups.”18 Despite its theoretical importance,


15

See MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE
ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 44 (2000) (“The intellectual
discipline of social choice grows out of a deceptively simple problem that a French
philosopher and mathematician, the Marquis de Condorcet, described in a famous
essay in 1785.”) (footnote omitted); see also Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and
Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2121, 2124 (1990) (noting that, in social
choice theory, the “most important discovery continues to be that for which the
economist Kenneth Arrow received the Nobel Prize”). For a discussion of the
intellectual history of social choice theory with a number of examples that have
been said to pre-date Condorcet and Arrow, see WULF GAERTNER, A PRIMER IN
SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 3–6 (2006).
16
See STEARNS, supra note 15, at 45 (explaining that the principle of
transitivity is that if “C is preferred to A and A is preferred to B” then it logically
follows that one must “prefer C to B”).
17
For an easy-to-follow explanation of the Condorcet paradox, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial
Courts, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 12 n.22 (1993).
18
STEARNS, supra note 15, at 45.
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Condorcet’s insight lay largely dormant until it was generalized by
Arrow’s
Kenneth Arrow in the mid-twentieth century.19
contribution was to extend Condorcet’s analysis to prove that
when “searching for democratic procedures that would aggregate
the given preferences of individuals into a single collective
outcome, . . . [Condorcet’s] paradox turns out to be an inescapable
feature of any decision-making process likely to be considered
even minimally fair.”20 Arrow was thus able to show that
democratic procedures alone are not able to create rational and fair
ways to resolve the paradox that Condorcet had identified.21
These initial insights created social choice theory, which is
perhaps best described as “the logical study of the properties of
collective decision-making processes.”22
Since Arrow’s
groundbreaking work, the field of social choice theory has
exploded to become one of the largest and most influential in the
social sciences.23 This research has focused “not so much [on] the
empirical question of how groups actually do make decisions, [but]
rather [on] the normative and logical questions of how they
should, and could, aggregate information about the views,
interests or preferences of individuals into group decisions.”24
Additionally, it is worth noting that not only have Condorcet’s and
Arrow’s important contributions influenced a large volume of
scholarship, but the research that has followed from their ideas has


19

See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed.
1963); see also Christian List & Ben Polak, Introduction to Judgment Aggregation, 145
J. ECON. THEORY 441, 442 (2010) (arguing that “Arrow’s work struck a chord across
the social sciences”). But see ELSTER, supra note 13, at 454 (“Kenneth Arrow may
have rediscovered and generalized Condorcet’s insight, but he was not influenced
by him.”).
20
Pildes & Anderson, supra note 15, at 2131.
21
For an excellent explanation of Arrow’s contribution, see ALFRED F.
MACKAY, ARROW’S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL CHOICE: A CASE STUDY IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS 1–5 (1980).
22
Pildes & Anderson, supra note 15, at 2124.
23
See STEARNS, supra note 15, at 45 (citing Sen, supra note 3, at 1765 n.7)
(arguing that “the modern theory of social choice” has “proved to be among the
largest and most influential bodies of social science literature”); see also Maxwell L.
Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, 103 YALE L.J. 1219, 1224 (1994)
(noting that the “literature in the field of social choice has proliferated”).
24
John S. Dryzek & Christian List, Social Choice Theory and Deliberative
Democracy: A Reconciliation, 33 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 1, 2-3 (2003).
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spanned a wide range of topics and fields.25 This is because the
realization that it may be impossible for the preferences of
individuals to be aggregated in a way that is consistent and
rational has profound implications for those concerned with the
outcomes produced by any collective decision-making body, from
tenure committees to juries to national legislatures.26
One specific branch of social choice theory that is of particular
relevance to judicial adjudication is judgment aggregation.27 The
key distinction that makes judgment aggregation a subfield of
broader social choice theory is that there is a difference between
the preferences of individuals and the judgments of individuals.28 In
other words, there is a difference between the statement “I prefer
outcome A” and the statement “outcome A is correct or true.” The
implication of this distinction is that there are greater logical
constraints imposed upon actors seeking to render judgments than
those simply trying to form collective decisions.29 Judgment
aggregation is thus distinct from general social choice theory
because it often deals with binary judgments instead of rankings of
preferences, and the importance of logical consistency to avoid
paradoxical results is higher.
Unsurprisingly, scholars interested in judgment aggregation
theory have paid particular attention to adjudication of multi-



25
See Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance of Social Choice, supra note 23, at
1224–25 (“Perhaps more astounding than the quantity of literature generated
under the label ‘social choice’ is the range of propositions that Condorcet’s initial
insight has been used to support in recent years.”); See also Sen, supra note 3, at
1764 (noting that social choice theory has “immediate and extensive implications
for economics, philosophy, politics, and the other social sciences”).
26
For an interesting recent example of how social choice theory can be used
to understand the law, see KATZ, supra note 7.
27
See generally Christian List & Philip Pettit, Aggregating Sets of Judgments:
Two Impossibility Results Compared, 140 SYNTHESE 207, 214 (2004) (describing an
aggregation procedure “which takes as its input a profile of complete, consistent
and deductively closed personal sets of judgments across the individuals . . . and
which produces as its output a collective set of judgments . . . which is also
complete, consistent and deductively closed”).
28
See Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking the Court, 96
YALE L.J. 82, 84 n.4 (1986) (“Sen introduces a distinction between the aggregation
of individual interests and individual judgments.”) (citing Amartya Sen, Social
Choice Theory: A Reexamination, 45 ECONOMETRICA 53 (1977), reprinted in AMARTYA
SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND MEASUREMENT 158 (1982)).
29
See List & Polak, supra note 19, at 442 (noting that judgment “aggregation
problems differ from preference aggregation not just in their interpretation, but
also in the constraints governing them”).
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member courts.30 This is both because multi-member courts are
collective decision-making institutions31 and also because there is a
high premium placed on logical consistency in judicial decisions.
Of course, although adjudication by multi-judge courts may be the
primary focus of judgment aggregation, it is worth noting that
judgment aggregation theory has evolved into a diverse field of
research.32 Research in judgment aggregation is related to work in
other fields, including abstract aggregation theories33 and belief
merging in computer science.34 In fact, the field has grown to the
point that that researchers have even attempted to leverage
insights from biology to understand collective decision-making
procedures.35 The common feature of all of these lines of research,
however, is the recognition that it can be impossible for multiple
actors to democratically make logically consistent decisions across
more than one issue.



30
See Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary is a They, Not An It: Interpretive Theory
and the Fallacy of Division, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 549, 553 n.8 (2005)
(“Important literatures in social choice and voting theory have explored
aggregation problems on multi-judge courts.”); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note
28, at 88 (“The distinction between preference aggregation and judgment
aggregation sharpens our focus on the question of multi-judge courts.”).
31
See Vermeule, supra note 30, at 552 (“[T]he collective structure of judicial
institutions means that it is simply inadequate to theorize about interpretation as
if the judiciary were a unitary institution, perhaps conceived as a single
individual.”).
32 See generally List, supra note 14 (exploring the growing research area related
to judgment aggregation).
33
See, e.g., Ariel Rubinstein & Peter C. Fishburn, Algebraic Aggregation Theory,
38 J. ECON. THEORY 63, 63 (1986) (presenting a unifying algebraic framework to
analyze general aggregation problems); Robert Wilson, On the Theory of
Aggregation, 10 J. ECON. THEORY 89, 89 (1975) (discussing how algebraic structures
support “logical restrictions on the possible ways of aggregating individuals’
preferences”).
34
See, e.g., Sébastien Konieczny & Ramón Pino Pérez, Merging Information
Under Constraints: A Logical Framework, 12 J. LOGIC & COMPUTATION 773, 805 (2002)
(presenting a “logical framework for belief base merging in the presence of
integrity constraints when there is no preference over the belief bases”); Gabriella
Pigozzi, Belief Merging and the Discursive Dilemma: An Argument-Based Account to
Paradoxes of Judgment Aggregation, 152 SYNTHESE 285, 295 (2006) (using a belief
merging operator defined in artificial intelligence to address the literature on
judgment aggregation).
35
See Christian List & Adrian Vermeule, Independence and Interdependence:
Lessons from the Hive 2 (Harvard Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 10-44, 2010), available at http://dx.doi.org
/10.2139/ssrn.1693908 (building upon judgment aggregation scholarship by
exploring the collective decision-making processes of honeybees).
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2.2. The Doctrinal Paradox
Although judgment aggregation theory has generated a
number of important ideas, one that is of particular importance to
adjudication is the doctrinal paradox.36 The doctrinal paradox was
first identified in an important article in the Yale Law Journal by
Kornhauser & Sager in 1986; however, the concept was mentioned
only in passing.37 Six years later, Kornhauser introduced the term
“doctrinal paradox,”38 and a body of scholarship began to develop
that explored the implications of their discovery.39 The basic
insight of the doctrinal paradox is that when judges have to decide
a series of connected issues in order to render an overall judgment
in a case, the resulting judgment is dependent on whether the
judges take a majority vote on the overall outcome of the case or if
the judges instead take separate votes on the individual issues of
the case.40 In other words, the specific protocol that judges use to
decide cases can produce different results.



36
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 12 n.22 (noting that “the doctrinal
paradox is distinct from the Condorcet paradox”). For an explanation of why the
doctrinal paradox is different than the Condorcet, logrolling, sequential, and
Ostrogorski paradoxes, see Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II: Legal
Doctrine, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 441 (1992) [hereinafter Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial
Courts II].
37
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 1 n.1 (noting that they “identified in
passing the doctrinal paradox” in their previous article on judgment aggregation
(citing Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 115–16)); see also List, supra note 14, at
2 (“The initial observation that motivated much of the current [research on
judgment aggregation] had its origins in the area of jurisprudence, in Kornhauser
and Sager’s work on decision making in collegial courts . . . .”) (citation omitted).
But see LIST & PETTIT, surpa note 4, at 43 (describing historical precursors to the
current literature).
38
See Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II, supra note 36, at 467 (outlining
how “[c]ase-by-case and issue-by-issue adjudication may, in some circumstances,
produce two different resolutions of a case”); see also List, supra note 14, at 181
(noting that the term “doctrinal paradox” was introduced by Kornhauser in his
1992 article). Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 3 (“This paradox, which we
call the doctrinal paradox, is a prominent instance of the broader proposition that
appellate adjudication is a collective endeavor that can only be fully understood
once its collective features are considered.”).
39
See Dimitri Landa & Jeffrey R. Lax, Legal Doctrine on Collegial Courts, 71 J.
POL. 946, 946 (2009) (“[Kornhauser & Sager’s initial] result was later named the
Doctrinal Paradox, and it inspired a growing body of literature on collegial
application of a fixed legal rule, spanning legal theory, social choice theory, and
deliberative democratic theory.”) (citations omitted).
40
For a useful, concise statement of the doctrinal paradox, see Jean-François
Bonnefon, Behavioral Evidence for Framing Effects in the Resolution of the Doctrinal
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The doctrinal paradox can be best illustrated through a simple
hypothetical example initially offered by Philip Pettit. His example
considers a three-judge court deciding a torts case.41 To decide the
case, assume that the existing legal doctrine holds that the judges
must first decide the outcome of two separate issues. The first
issue is whether the defendant’s negligence was causally
responsible for the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The second issue
is whether the defendant had a duty of care towards the plaintiff.
Based on their answers to those two issues, the judges then have to
determine if they believe that the plaintiff is indeed liable in the
case. Assume the three judges make the following judgments on
each of the three questions:

Judge A
Judge B
Judge C
Outcome

Cause of Harm?
Yes
Yes
No
2–1

Duty of Care?
Yes
No
Yes
2–1

Liable?
Yes
No
No
1-2

In this scenario, there are two judges who believe that the
defendant is not liable. As a result, if the court were to aggregate
their judgment by simply taking the majority view as to whether
the defendant was liable, the decision would be in favor of the
defendant. On the other hand, there were two votes in favor of the
plaintiff on both of the sub-issues of the case. If the court were to
aggregate their judgment by taking the majority view on each of
the sub-issues of the case, the result would be in favor of the
plaintiff.
Since these are both logically justifiable ways to



Paradox, 34 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 631, 631 (2010) (“A doctrinal paradox occurs
when majority voting on a compound proposition (such as a conjunction or
disjunction) yields a different result than majority voting on each of the elements
of the proposition.”). For one of the initial articulations of the paradox, see
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 11 (“The fact that a court in a rather simple
case of this sort could face a choice between two voting protocols, each of which
seems quite reasonable, indeed natural, to follow and yet discover that the
outcome of the case will turn on the choice between them, is the product of a
structural paradox latent in appellate adjudication.”).
41
Philip Pettit, Collective Persons and Powers, 8 LEGAL THEORY 443, 444–45
(2002). It has been argued that this was roughly the situation in the famous torts
case, Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928). Lewis A. Kornhauser,
Aggregate Rationality in Adjudication and Legislation, 7 POL., PHIL. & ECON. 5, 15
(2008).
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aggregate the judgment of the court, the aggregation method that
the court selects will determine the outcome of the case. Thus, as
this illustration of the doctrinal paradox makes clear, this
distribution of individual beliefs makes the ultimate outcome of
the case indeterminate.42
From this insight—that the way judgments are aggregated
impacts the outcome of cases—a robust literature quickly
developed that focused on multi-member courts.43 The initial



42 It is worth noting that judges may still be open to persuasion and willing to
change their minds on how issues should be resolved. The doctrinal paradox
occurs, however, when the views held by decision-makers result in the type of
distribution we have just described. In other words, the logic does not assume
that preferences are fixed, but instead that at times, even judges open to
persuasion may not reach agreement.
43
For a general discussion of the evolution of the literature, see Lewis A.
Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme Courts, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND LITIGATION 45 (Boudewijn Bouckaert &
Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000), available at http://encyclo.findlaw.com/7200book.pdf
[hereinafter Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme Courts]. To follow the progression of
the debate in jurisprudential circles as set forth in Kornhauser, Appeal and Supreme
Courts, see John M. Rogers, “I Vote This Way Because I’m Wrong”: The Supreme
Court Justice as Epimenides, 79 KY. L.J. 439 (1991) (preferring case-by-case
aggregation to issue-by-issue aggregation because of the latter’s possibility of
creating indeterminacy and incoherence); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial
Courts I: Path-Dependence, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 169 (1992) (identifying the
possibility of choosing among result-bound, rule-bound, and reason-bound
elements of stare decisis in the process of decision-making and arguing in favor of
result-bound decisions); Kornhauser, Modeling Collegial Courts II, supra note 36, at
453–57 (introducing the term “doctrinal paradox” and differentiating it from the
Condorcet cycle); David Post & Steven C. Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater: A
Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels, 80 GEO. L.J. 743 (1992) [hereinafter Post &
Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater] (favoring issue-by-issue aggregation because
it will yield the same results every time and encourages collegial deliberation
among judges); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 57 (suggesting that the
multi-judge panels have a “metavote” on whether the judges should adopt a caseby-case outcome or an issue-by-issue outcome); John M. Rogers, supra note 9, at
1038 (arguing against issue-by-issue aggregation because judges cannot agree on
how to divide the issues, and even if they were to agree, judges would
occasionally oppose a judgment of their own court); Maxwell L. Stearns, How
Outcome Voting Promotes Principled Issue Identification: A Reply to Professor John
Rogers and Others, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1045, (1996) (challenging Rogers’ argument
that dividing issues is a difficult task); David G. Post & Steven Salop, Issues and
Outcomes, Guidance, and Indeterminacy: A Reply to Professor John Rogers and Others,
49 VAND. L. REV. 1069 (1996) [hereinafter Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes]
(supporting Stearns’s argument that it is not problematic to divide issues in
decision-making); Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms on
Multimember Courts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2297, at 2380 (1999) (arguing against votetrading and collegial decision-making); Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive
Voting Protocol for Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 75–15 (2003) (offering a

Ͳʹ

ͺʹ

Ǧ  ȋ ȌȋȌ

U.Pa.J.Int’lL.

ͳȀͳͺȀʹͲͳ͵ͷǣʹͶ

ȏǤ͵Ͷǣͳ


focus of research into the doctrinal paradox was thus on the
implications for appellate adjudication.44 Although the original
paradox formulation focused on cases where judges must decide
issues that are sequenced in an specific order because of existing
legal doctrine,45 Philip Pettit generalized the doctrinal paradox by
showing the problem arises any time a group must decide a series
of related issues.46 Pettit thus renamed this phenomenon the
discursive dilemma,47 and he helped extend the reach of the
literature from concerns over jurisprudence to political and formal
theory more broadly.48 In this paper, we will continue to refer to
this phenomenon as the doctrinal paradox.



methodology for addressing disputes when doctrinal paradoxes arise); Michael I.
Meyerson, The Irrational Supreme Court, 84 Neb. L. Rev. 895, at 955 (2006)
(exploring the idea that “group decision-making leads to the unavoidable
possibility of truly irrational opinions, those in which a majority of Justices vote
that one party prevails on all relevant issues, but that party still loses that case”).
44
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 6 (“Appellate adjudication by
multi-judge courts is a complex practice which has important ingredients of both
redundant and collegial enterprise.”); Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28, at 82
(“Appellate adjudication, the common, almost exclusive focus of theories of
adjudication, is thus essentially a group process, yet extant theories neither
explain the group nature of the process nor take it into account.”) (footnote
omitted).
45
Philip Pettit, Groups with Minds of Their Own, in SOCIALIZING METAPHYSICS:
THE NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY 167, 168 (Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 2003) (“This
paradox arises when a multimember court has to make a decision on the basis of
received doctrine as to the considerations that ought to determine the resolution
of a case: that is, on the basis of a conceptual sequencing of matters to be
decided.”) (citation omitted).
46
See Philip Pettit, Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma, 11 PHIL.
ISSUES 268, 274 (2001) (listing five basic elements that summarize the doctrinal
paradox).
47
See id. at 272 (“I prefer the word ‘discursive’, because the problem in
question is not tied to the acceptance of common doctrine, only to the enterprise
of making group judgments on the basis of reasons. I prefer the word ‘dilemma’,
because while the problem generates a choice in which each option has its
difficulties, it does not constitute a paradox in any strict sense.”).
48
For an excellent review of the evolution of the literature that has emerged
from Kornhauser & Sager’s discovery of the doctrinal paradox, see List, supra note
14. For examples of the formularization and increasingly generalized nature of
the literature that has emerged, see generally, Franz Dietrich & Philippe Mongin,
The Premiss-Based Approach to Judgment Aggregation, 145 J. ECON. THEORY 562
(2010); Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Strategy-Proof Judgment Aggregation, 23
ECON. & PHIL. 269 (2007); Christian List, The Discursive Dilemma and Public Reason,
116 ETHICS 362 (2006); Christian List, The Probability of Inconsistencies in Complex
Collective Decisions, 24 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 3 (2005); Christian List & Philip
Pettit, On the Many as One: A Reply to Kornhauser and Sager, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 377
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2.3. The Doctrinal Paradox in Practice
Although scholars discussing the doctrinal paradox have
primarily focused on situations in which the problems associated
with judgment aggregation could theoretically arise,49 research on
this topic did not take off until a series of court cases brought the
paradox to the attention of academics.50 Shortly after Kornhauser
& Sager’s initial identification of the doctrinal paradox, two
Supreme Court cases occurred in which a Justice purposely voted
against the rationale he agreed with to avoid the distribution of
votes fitting the conditions of the doctrinal paradox. Scholars then
identified other cases where the doctrinal paradox occurred in the
course of appellate litigation.
The first of the Supreme Court cases was Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co.51 In this case, the Supreme Court had to decide two related
issues.52 The first issue was whether the Eleventh Amendment
bars Congress from acting under the Commerce Clause in a way
that makes states vulnerable to suit in federal court. The second
issue was, assuming that Congress did have the power, whether
the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA) was an exercise of that power. For the case to go forward,
both questions had to be answered “yes.” In this instance, five
Justices did answer “yes” to each question—but not the same five.
As a result of the distribution of views, only four Justices were
supportive of allowing the suit to go forward. To avoid this
paradoxical result, Justice White explicitly changed his vote on the
outcome of the case in favor of allowing the suit to go forward,
although his reasoning would have otherwise dictated against it.



(2005); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, The Many as One: Integrity and
Group Choice in Paradoxical Cases, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 249 (2004).
49
See, e.g., List, supra note 14, at 179 (noting that the problems associated with
judgment aggregation theory can arise in contexts “ranging from legislative
committees to referenda, from expert panels to juries and multi-member courts,
from boards of companies to international organizations, from families and
informal social groups to societies at large”).
50
See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 1 n.1 (noting that the rise in
scholarship on this topic is likely because “the Supreme Court’s recent and
disturbing encounters with the doctrinal paradox have begun to excite attention”).
51
491 U.S. 1 (1989). For a discussion of this case, see generally Rogers, “I Vote
This Way”, supra note 43.
52
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 14.

Ͳʹ

Ǧ  ȋ ȌȋȌ

ͺͶ

U.Pa.J.Int’lL.

ͳȀͳͺȀʹͲͳ͵ͷǣʹͶ

ȏǤ͵Ͷǣͳ


Thus, the court only avoided the doctrinal paradox because an
individual Justice changed his vote.

Blackmun
Brennan
Kennedy
Marshall
O’Connor
Rehnquist
Scalia
Stevens
White
Outcome

Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
Power to
Exercised in SARA?
Act?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
5–4
5–4

Allow Suit?
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
?
?

Just two years later, the same phenomenon occurred in Arizona
v. Fulminante.53 In Fulminante, the Supreme Court decided three
connected issues.54 The first issue was whether the defendant in
the case was coerced into a confession. The second issue was
whether the “harmless error” doctrine applies if a coerced
confession is entered into evidence. Assuming both issues are
answered in the affirmative, the third issue was whether the
admission of the defendant’s testimony in this particular case was
a non-harmless error. Only if all three questions were answered
“yes” would the defendant be given a new trial. In this case, a
majority did answer affirmatively on each issue. However, as with
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., the distribution of beliefs was such
that if the Justices voted based on their individual determination as
to whether a new trial should occur, the answer would be no. Here
again, the two aggregation methods produced different
outcomes.55 As a result, Justice Kennedy changed his vote on
whether a new trial should be awarded so that the outcome of the


53

499 U.S. 279 (1991).
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 14–15.
55
As others have argued, it is important to speak in the “speculative voice”
in this case because Justice Souter chose not to vote on every part of the case.
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 15 n.36.
54
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case reflected the votes on each of the individual propositions in
the case.
Arizona v. Fulminante
Coerced
Harmless
NonNew
Confession?
Error
harmless
Trial?
Applied?
Error?
Blackmun
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Kennedy
No
Yes
Yes
?
Marshall
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
O’Connor
No
Yes
No
No
Rehnquist
No
Yes
No
No
Scalia
Yes
Yes
No
No
Souter
No
Yes
Not
Not
Decided
Decided
Stevens
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
White
Yes
No
Yes
Yes
Outcome
5–4
5–4
5–3
?
In addition to these two examples where Justices changed their
votes on the outcome of the case to avoid the doctrinal paradox,
scholars identified and began to debate a third case in which the
doctrinal paradox came before the Supreme Court.56 In National
Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,57 the Supreme Court
had to decide two issues to determine if diversity jurisdiction
should extend to citizens of the District of Columbia.58 The first
issue was whether the District of Columbia counted as a “state” for
the purpose of diversity jurisdiction in federal court. The second
issue was whether Congress could extend diversity jurisdiction
beyond the strict confines of Article III of the Constitution. An
affirmative answer to either question would provide a basis to
extend diversity jurisdiction to the citizens of D.C. In the case,
however, a substantial majority rejected both rationales. That said,
there were still five votes in favor of extending diversity
jurisdiction overall. As a result, by a margin of five votes to four,


56

See, e.g., Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 748–50,
764–65 (describing National Mutual Insurance v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582
(1949), as an example of the doctrinal paradox).
57
337 U.S. 582 (1949).
58
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 20–21 (summarizing Tidewater’s
doctrinal issues).
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the Court decided to extend jurisdiction, although a substantial
majority of the Court rejected both possible rationales for doing so.
National Mutual Insurance v. Tidewater Transfer Co.
Is D.C. a
Extending Article III?
Statute
“State”?
Valid?
Black
Yes
No
Yes
Burton
Yes
No
Yes
Douglas
No
No
No
Frankfurter
No
No
No
Jackson
Yes
No
Yes
Murphy
No
Yes
Yes
Reed
No
No
No
Rutledge
No
Yes
Yes
Vinson
No
No
No
Outcome
3–6
2–7
5–4
These examples help illustrate three important points about the
doctrinal paradox. First, the doctrinal paradox is not simply a
theoretical possibility; the opinions of judges in real cases have
been distributed such that the outcome of the case hinged on the
method of judgment aggregation that was employed. Second,
since judges are willing to change their votes to avoid the doctrinal
paradox, it may be that the doctrinal paradox is influencing the
outcome of cases where the paradox itself is not observed. Third, if
courts do not explicitly select a formal judgment aggregation
method, individual judges may change their votes to ensure the
outcome of the case is consistent with the method they deem most
legitimate.
Taken together, these points illustrate why the
doctrinal paradox should be of interest to scholars and
practitioners who care about judicial outcomes being consistent
and fair.
2.4. The Options for Avoiding Indeterminacy
As the previous discussion illustrates, it is not merely a
theoretical possibility that the distribution of judgments in a case
can create two logically justifiable outcomes. Rather, the doctrinal
paradox is a real phenomenon that impacts the disposition of cases
adjudicated on multi-member courts. As described above, courts
have two possible judgment aggregation methods at their
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disposal.59 The first, outcome-based voting, resolves cases by
counting the judges’ votes on what the result of the case should be.
This was the approach taken by the Court in Tidewater.60 The
second method, issue-based voting, resolves cases by taking the
majority vote on each issue considered in the case, and then
adopting the logically required outcome dictated by those votes.
In both Union Gas61 and Fulminante,62 one Justice changed his vote
so that the resolution of the case was consistent with issue-based
voting. Although these two judgment aggregation methods have
been given different names by different commentators,63 there has
been an active debate comparing the relative drawbacks of these
approaches in the decision-making processes of the U.S. Supreme
Court and of the Circuit Courts of Appeal.64
Unfortunately, the doctrinal paradox is a problem without an
easy solution. The primary objection to issue-based voting has
focused on the problems associated with forcing judges to agree on
what issues are at stake in each case.65 In cases with clearly
established doctrine that dictates exactly what issues the members
of a court must decide and in what order they must decide them,
this is not a major problem, and issue-based voting may be a
reasonable practice. However, in many cases, identifying the legal
issues is itself a complicated matter. For example, current Sixth


59

See, e.g., Dietrich & Mongin, supra note 48, at 563 (“Prima facie, there are
two plausible ways for the court to reach a decision by taking majority votes.”).
60
See supra text accompanying notes 56–58 (discussing the doctrinal paradox
in Tidewater).
61
See supra text accompanying notes 51–52 (discussing Union Gas).
62
See supra text accompanying notes 53–55 (discussing Fulminante and
comparing the case with Union Gas).
63
See List & Polak, supra note 19, at 459 (noting that within the class of
aggregation rules are included “premise-based rules” or “issue-by-issue voting,”
on the one hand, and “conclusion-based rules” or “case-by-case voting,” on the
other); Bonnefon, supra note 40, at 632 (discussing “elemental” versus “compound
aggregation”).
64
We focus on the drawbacks because the existing scholarship primarily
addresses which one of the judgment aggregation methods has greater flaws. See,
e.g., Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes, supra note 43, at 1084 (advocating for issuebased voting while noting that “[b]oth issue voting and outcome voting have
potential flaws.”).
65
For a very clear summary of how social choice theory explains this result,
see Stearns, supra note 43, at 1063 (“Without outcome[-based] voting, the
determination of issues and issue levels would determine the outcome of the
case.”).
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Circuit Judge John M. Rogers illustrated this problem while still a
professor at the University of Kentucky College of Law by
identifying seventeen different issues that were decided, explicitly
or implicitly, by the Supreme Court in Tidewater en route to
determining how to dispose of the case.66 If courts were to adopt
issue-based voting procedures, the concern is that “judges would
have an incentive to divide down [the issues of the case], until a
favorable voting path emerges . . . .”67 This method thus gives the
advantage to the members of a court who can successfully
manipulate the proceedings to ensure that their preferred set of
issues are the ones that will be decided in any given case.68
Moreover, issue-based voting creates the additional problem of
harming judicial economy because judges are forced to consider
how they would resolve each issue that the court determined was
important in a given case, even if they have already found a
dispositive issue.69 Although some scholars have downplayed
these concerns, the major drawback of issue-based voting is that it
pushes judges to focus on strategically advantageous issues instead
of legally important ones.70
In contrast, the major drawback of outcome-based voting is that it
produces confusing legal precedent. The argument is that when
decisions in cases such as Tidewater are handed down, the “orderly
development of legal doctrine” is harmed.71 When a case is
decided such that the reasoning and votes on the individual issues
do not support the conclusion reached by the court, “it produces
precedent that is both less useful and may be incapable of coherent


66

Rogers, supra note 9, at 1002–04 (cataloguing the “Issues on which justices
disagreed in Tidewater” as well as “the number of votes for and against the
issue”).
67
Stearns, supra note 43, at 1064.
68
See id. (“With issue[-based] voting, one imagines [judicial] confirmation
proceedings in which the parliamentary skills of the Supreme Court nominees are
. . . more[] important than such matters as integrity, fitness for judicial service,
knowledge of the law, or even jurisprudential perspective.”).
69
Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 758-59
(describing the judicial economy argument often advanced in favor of outcomebased voting).
70
See Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes, supra note 43, at 1074–75 (explaining
Professor Rogers’ “indeterminacy objection” to issue-based voting—that “[t]here
is no developed body of law on how issues must be divided for separate voting”).
71
Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 25.
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application.”72 It is unclear, for instance, how a court should apply
the Tidewater decision to a future case that involves only a subset of
the same issues because, in Tidewater, the finding on the individual
issues did not support the ultimate outcome. Even if outcomebased voting makes it easier to decide a specific case because the
judges do not have to decide which issues are important, this
method will make the resolution of future cases harder due to the
logical disconnect between the rationales that have been provided
and the outcomes that are required. Of course, it could be said that
this is no more problematic than plurality opinions, which courts
already have to interpret to determine precedent,73 but it is still a
problem that outcome voting injects logically inconsistent positions
into the law.
Given that this discussion may make issue-based and outcomebased judgment aggregation methods both seem unappealing, it is
perhaps unsurprising that some scholars have advocated a flexible
approach that allows multi-member courts to implement one or the
other method based on the facts and circumstances of an
individual case.74
Although we will discuss the tradeoffs
associated with flexible voting in more detail in Section 5, it is
important to note at the outset that failure to clearly establish a
fixed judgment aggregation method also has a significant
drawback: indeterminacy. Indeterminacy occurs when it is unclear
how an actor or institution—like a multi-member court—will act in
the face of a given set of preferences or judgments.75
Indeterminacy is a problem for judicial adjudication because it
means that the same case could have a different result depending


72

See Post & Salop, Issues and Outcomes, supra note 43, at 1070 (referring to
this problem as the “guidance objection” to outcome-based voting).
73
See Rogers, supra note 9, at 1007 (stating that, while practitioners seeking to
apply plurality opinions “must examine how the authors of each opinion would
resolve the case,” plurality opinions, in aggregate, “have the full force of law”)
(citing Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of
Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46 (1994)).
74
See, e.g., Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 30–33 (advocating for judges
to use a “metavote”—a vote at the “collegial action” stage on whether to apply
issue-based or outcome-based voting—in cases where the doctrinal paradox
occurs); Nash, supra note 43, at 146–57 (proposing a “context-sensitive voting
protocol” by which courts determine whether to use either issue-based or
outcome-based voting).
75
See ELSTER, supra note 13, at 415–16 (using the example of a municipal
council to demonstrate that social preferences might be indeterminate—there
might be no procedure that accurately predicts the outcome of a group decision).
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on which procedure the court adopted, and that it is impossible to
know which way the court will act from case to case.76 For
example, imagine the cries of unfairness that would arise if in some
cases a tie vote by the Supreme Court (which can occur if a Justice
recuses himself or herself) resulted in deferring to the circuit court,
while in other cases the tie was broken by the most senior Justice
participating in the decision. Moreover, an additional drawback of
a flexible approach is that when confronted with a case that
presents a doctrinal paradox, judges will have to decide both the
issues of the case and the procedure that should be used to
aggregate the vote. As a result, simply leaving courts to address
the doctrinal paradox may not necessarily be the optimal solution.
At this point, it should hopefully be clear that there are
tradeoffs associated with every approach when faced with the
doctrinal paradox. What is less clear, however, is how the
particular features of adjudication in international settings affect
these tradeoffs. International courts may have reason to be
especially sensitive to the problem of wasting judicial resources
associated with issue-based voting, the problem of communicating
unclear precedent to other legal actors associated with outcomebased voting, and the problem of real and perceived arbitrariness
associated with flexible approaches. It is thus worth analyzing the
implications of the doctrinal paradox for adjudication in
international settings. We begin this project here.
3.

CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINAL PARADOX IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

While scholars have long recognized the important concerns
that the doctrinal paradox poses for judicial adjudication, very
little research has addressed its application to international
adjudication. This oversight is particularly surprising because, in
the second half of the twentieth century, the number of forums for
international dispute resolution exploded.77 Today there are more



76
See Vermeule, supra note 5, at 14 (“Here too, however, a less provocative
way of stating the problem is in terms of indeterminacy rather than incoherence: a
given profile of judgments will yield different collective judgments under
different aggregation procedures.”).
77
See generally Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferation of International Judicial
Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 709 (1999) (providing a
systemic overview of the expansion of the international judiciary). See also Eric A.
Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CALIF. L.
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than 140 different judicial bodies and procedures that exist to
resolve international legal disputes.78 Of these bodies, there are
currently more than twenty-five permanent international courts
with independent judges issuing decisions that are legally
binding.79 These international judicial bodies have become
increasingly powerful while addressing a range of important
substantive legal issues,80 from facilitating the integration of
Europe81 to changing the scope of the laws of war.82 Moreover, the
proliferation of international institutions and courts has also given
rise to a series of new issues that are not simply international
analogs of domestic problems, but instead unique by-products of
the international environment.83 While it is indisputable that the



REV. 1, 3 (2005) (“[I]nternational courts proliferated in the aftermath of World War
II, with a noticeable acceleration after the end of the Cold War.”).
78
See Romano, supra note 1, at 241–42 (stating that the rapid growth of
international dispute resolution forums in the post-Cold War era, “with well over
142 bodies and procedures,” has been difficult to “comprehensively map”).
79
See Karen J. Alter, The Evolving International Judiciary (Buffett Ctr. for Int’l &
Comparative Studies, Working Paper Series No. 11/002, 2011) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859507 (“[T]here are at
least 26 permanent international courts . . . .”); see also Erik Voeten, The Impartiality
of International Judges: Evidence from the European Court of Human Rights, 102 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 417, 417 (2008) (“[S]tates have created about two dozen permanent
international judicial bodies with formally independent judges that issue legally
binding judgments and many more quasi-judicial or nonpermanent dispute
settlement mechanisms.”) (citing DANIEL TERRIS, CESARE P.R. ROMANO, & LEIGH
SWIGART, THE INTERNATIONAL JUDGE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MEN AND WOMEN
WHO DECIDE THE WORLD’S CASES 4–5 (2007)).
80
Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 11 (“[I]nternational tribunals have become
more powerful as a matter of formal law over time. Compulsory jurisdiction has
become more common, and the judiciaries have become more independent of the
states that establish them.”).
81
See generally J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403
(1991) (explaining the role of the European Court of Justice, among other
international institutions, in creating a cohesive European Community). See also
Randall W. Stone, Risk in International Politics, 9 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 40, 58 (2009)
(noting that “international courts have steadily expanded their prerogatives and
provided a powerful impulse to European integration”) (citing Geoffrey Garrett,
International Cooperation and Institutional Choice: The European Community’s Internal
Market, 46 INT’L ORG. 533 (1992)).
82
See generally Allison Marston Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the
International Criminal Tribunals Recast the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2006)
(discussing the role of the Nuremberg, Tokyo, Yugoslavia and Rwanda
international military and criminal tribunals and the International Criminal Court
in shaping the laws of war).
83
See, e.g., Stone, supra note 81, at 41 (arguing that long-term problems are
harder to address “at the international level, because the international level
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scope of international adjudication is expanding, it is also the case
that international legal institutions are still in their early stages of
development, and their decisions are frequently ignored by
litigants.84
As a result of the unique challenges faced by
international courts and tribunals, international adjudication is
fertile ground upon which to explore the implications of the
doctrinal paradox. This Section aims to start that process by
exploring the reasons why the doctrinal paradox is especially
potent in international settings. To do so, we have collected
original data on the policy and procedures used to decide cases in
permanent international courts. Further, we undertake one of the
first efforts to present comparative data on the rates at which
dissenting and concurring opinions are filed in international
courts.
This Section proceeds in four parts. First, we discuss the lack of
attention paid to the unique risks associated with judgment
aggregation and the doctrinal paradox in international
adjudication. Many parties are guilty of this lapse, including
political theorists working on social choice questions, scholars of
international law, and policy makers who have established
international institutions. Second, we explore why the conditions
that lead to the doctrinal paradox are present in international
settings. These reasons include: the role of dissenting opinions in
international judgments, the potential for bias that results from the
design of international adjudicatory bodies, and the still-evolving
nature of international laws and procedures. Third, we explain
that when the designers of international legal institutions do not
consider the tradeoffs associated with different judgment
aggregation policies, judges are placed in a position to establish
procedures that may lead to undesirable outcomes. Specifically,
we argue that the failure to establish formal judgment aggregation
rules creates a risk of both allowing informal coercion and



imposes greater supermajority requirements”); Karen J. Alter, Delegating to
International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 37, 43–44 (2008) (explaining how compulsory dispute adjudication “differs
fundamentally at the international level compared to the domestic level” because
the interests of the state and the international court are not aligned); Jacob Katz
Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411,
434 (2008) (noting that “there are a number of factors, some unique . . . to the
international system, that work in favor of judicial discretion”).
84
See infra Section 3.4.
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exacerbating the democratic deficit already present in international
institutions. Finally, this Section concludes by arguing that the
doctrinal paradox poses risks to already-weak international
institutions that are greater than those posed in domestic settings.
Simply put, in international settings, disgruntled litigants have a
greater range of options, including noncompliance and exit, when
confronted with adverse decisions.
Consequently, issuing
decisions that do not clearly communicate the state of the law
impedes the development of the corpus of international law.
3.1. Situating Judgment Aggregation in International Adjudication
The contributions of social choice theory, including the
doctrinal paradox, have particular relevance for understanding the
law generally, collective decision-making, and how to structure
practices and procedures in adjudicatory institutions.85 The value
of these insights is not only applicable in domestic contexts, but
also provides leverage to problems that arise in international
settings.
Despite this fact, there has been an unfortunate
discrepancy between the progress made in judgment aggregation
theory and the application of this theory to international
adjudication. In this Section, we argue that there has been a lack of
attention to the unique features of judgment aggregation in
international settings from scholars researching the doctrinal
paradox and social choice theory more broadly, from international
law scholars, and from the institutional designers of international
courts and tribunals.
First, scholars of the doctrinal paradox have not considered the
unique features of international adjudication in their research. The
first discussion of the doctrinal paradox arose in passing in
Kornhauser & Sager’s prominent article Unpacking the Court, which
analyzed theories of adjudication for multi-judge courts.86 The
subsequent research on this topic moved to a discussion of specific
Supreme Court and appellate court decisions in the United States.87
From this line of research, scholars quickly pivoted to
abstracting away from specific historical cases, pointing out that


85

See generally STEARNS & ZYWICKI, supra note 5.
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 28.
87
See supra Section 2.3; see, e.g., Rogers, “I Vote This Way”, supra note 43
(citing various Supreme Court decisions to evaluate the ramifications of the
doctrinal paradox upon the vote of various justices).
86

Ͳʹ

Ǧ  ȋ ȌȋȌ

ͻͶ

U.Pa.J.Int’lL.

ͳȀͳͺȀʹͲͳ͵ͷǣʹͶ

ȏǤ͵Ͷǣͳ


the doctrinal paradox is a general problem that can occur in a
range of situations.88 Since this analytic move, researchers have
primarily focused on providing hypothetical cases where the
doctrinal paradox could arise in order to illustrate broader
theoretical claims.89 The result is that researchers have not only
failed to use examples from international courts and tribunals to
illustrate their points,90 but they have also failed to consider how
indeterminate results might either arise from or create unique
problems in international settings.91
Second, academics researching adjudication in international
courts and tribunals do not appear to have taken note of the
doctrinal paradox, or judgment aggregation theory more broadly,
in their scholarship. Although there have been passing references
to the doctrinal paradox in scholarship on international law,92 it
does not appear that any research has tried to systematically
explain the implications that this line of research has for
international courts and tribunals. The cursory attention that the
doctrinal paradox has received is in many ways surprising. In the
last several decades, scholarship in international law has
increasingly incorporated ideas from international relations and
other disciplines.93 This development has been largely embraced


88

See, e.g., Pettit, supra note 41, at 451–54 (explaining that the doctrinal
paradox or “discursive dilemma” arises in any group context).
89
See, e.g., List & Polak, supra note 19, at 6–15 (describing the interplay of
judgment aggregation and Arrow’s theorem); see also List, supra note 14, at 179
(“[T]he theory of judgment aggregation looks at the structural properties that
different judgment aggregation problems have in common, abstracting from the
details of individual cases.”).
90
Not only have prominent scholars not discussed cases from transnational
courts, but there also does not appear to be much discussion in the literature of
examples of the doctrinal paradox occurring in domestic courts outside the
United States. But see Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 12 (mentioning the
House of Lords and other English “superior” courts as an example of collegial
courts).
91
See D. Daniel Sokol, Explaining the Importance of Public Choice for Law, 109
MICH. L. REV. 1029, 1040–48 (2011) (explaining the failure of Stearns and Zywicki’s
recent book PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS, supra note 5, to address the presence of
these issues in the international context).
92
See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes, 11
CHI. J. INT’L L. 693, 741 (2011) (citing scholarship on the doctrinal paradox to
support the proposition that “group behavior must be analyzed at the group level
in order to make sense of it”) (internal citation omitted).
93
Kenneth W. Abbott, International Relations Theory, International Law, and the
Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 361, 361 (1999)
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as a way of developing a deeper and more complex understanding
of how diverse political actors behave during international
adjudication.94
Moreover, instead of ignoring theoretical concerns, the
literature on international courts and tribunals has largely formed
around several important debates with strong theoretical
underpinnings. For example, scholars have actively debated
whether the proliferation of international legal institutions creates
a risk of fragmentation;95 which features of international tribunals
are most likely to engender compliance by parties to the
litigation;96 and what the limits of international law are and should
be.97 As part of this recent theoretical turn in international legal
scholarship, there have even been occasional attempts to integrate
ideas from social choice theory.98 These attempts, however, have



(“[I]nternational relations (IR) theory, a branch of political science, has animated
some of the most exciting scholarship in international law.”).
94
See, e.g., David D. Caron, Towards a Political Theory of International Courts
and Tribunals, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 401, 406 (2006) (“[O]ur understanding of the
variety of political functions of, and justifications for, courts becomes richer and
more complex by examining international courts and tribunals not only in terms
of international relations, but also in terms of the political theory of domestic
courts.”).
95
See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, The Proliferation of International Courts and
Tribunals: International Adjudication in Ascendance, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 160
(2000) (discussing the consequences that the lack of attention given to new courts
and tribunals may have on international law); Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of
Fragmentation or Unification of the International Legal System and the International
Court of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 791, 798–801 (1999) (suggesting that a
more dynamic International Court of Justice is necessary to remedy concerns
pertaining to lack of clarity in international law).
96
Compare Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 27–28 (arguing that the most
successful tribunals are dependent tribunals), with Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors
Posner and Yoo, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 899, 901–05 (2005) (explaining the faultiness of
Professor Posner and Yoo’s theory that dependent tribunals are most effective and
desirable form of tribunal) (citing Posner & Yoo, supra note 77).
97
See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
203 (2005) (“Efforts to improve international cooperation must bow to the logic of
state self-interest and state power.”); see also ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 33–48 (2008) (explaining
how the concepts of reputation, reciprocity, and retaliation are central to
understanding the scope and role of international law).
98
See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan III, Barbarians Inside the Gate: Public Choice Theory
and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 745, 754–67 (1995)
(discussing how public choice theory is useful in analyzing matters of
international law, particularly executive power, currency controls, trade, and the
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overlooked the doctrinal paradox as a specific and useful insight.
As a result, international law scholars have not yet considered
whether international courts and tribunals should take actions to
avoid the possible indeterminate voting patterns that the doctrinal
paradox can create.
Third, it does not appear that the instruments drafted to
establish international courts and tribunals have provided
guidance on how cases that produce indeterminate voting patterns
should be resolved. To investigate this issue further, we collected
the rules of procedure for the permanent international courts and
tribunals identified in Professor Karen Alter’s recent article
surveying the international judiciary.99 For each of these judicial
bodies, we collected the treaty establishing the court or tribunal as
well as the documents published by the court that established the
rules and procedures for how judgments would be made.100 For
each document, we then evaluated five elements of the rules that
are relevant to the question of whether the doctrinal paradox could
be observable and how it should be resolved.101 Those elements
are: (1) whether the tribunal’s decisions are made public; (2)
whether a reason for each decision is required; (3) whether dissents
are allowed; (4) how “majority voting” is discussed in the event
that dissents are permitted; and finally, (5) whether there is any
discussion of how judgments should be aggregated when
indeterminate voting patterns occur. The results of this research
are presented in the Appendix.102



protection of culture); see also John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, Against
Global Governance in the WTO, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 353, 354–58 (2004) (citing
scholarship on public choice theory to support the proposition that the scope of
WTO authority should not be expanded).
99
For a discussion of the Alter’s typology, see Alter, supra note 79.
100
Alter’s list contains twenty-five permanent international courts. Id. at 4.
Unfortunately, insufficient documentation was available to reliably code the
policies of five courts: the Benelux Court of Justice (BCJ); the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU); the Central African Monetary
Community (CEMAC); the Dispute resolution system of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); and the Southern Common Market
(MERCUSOR). As a result, these courts were not included in the Appendix, infra.
101
See Appendix, infra for a complete summary of the provisions of each of
the permanent international courts and tribunals that are relevant to judgment
aggregation.
102 It is worth noting that there is still considerable work to be done to fully
explain the variation in the procedures used by international courts and tribunals.
We are not aware of any academic efforts to fully document the different
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Based on this analysis, we can say with confidence that
international courts do not have formal rules that govern how
judgments should be aggregated when the doctrinal paradox
occurs during adjudication. Of course, given that domestic courts
have not formally adopted judgment aggregation mechanisms, it is
unsurprising that permanent international courts and tribunals
have not either. Interestingly, our data show that seventeen of the
nineteen judicial bodies we analyzed do have a rule in place
asserting that decisions will be made by a majority vote. For
example, Article 55 of the International Court of Justice Statute
provides: “All questions shall be decided by a majority of the
judges present.”103 However, these treaties are not clear as to
whether a majority vote is required for each of the issues presented
in a case, or for the overall resolution of the controversy. This
situation means that the doctrinal paradox is a real possibility for
the majority of the international courts. This lack of clarity is
particularly extreme in the case of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (“IACtHR”). Article 16 of the Rules of Procedure of
the IACtHR provides: “The Presidency shall present, point by
point, the matters to be voted upon. . . . The decisions of the Court
shall be adopted by a majority of the Judges present at the time of
the voting.”104 Alas, the text does not clarify what the Court
should do if the individual votes mandated by the President differ
from the overall majority view on what the outcome of the case
should be. Moreover, not only do the rules governing the judicial
procedures of international courts fail to explicitly provide
judgment aggregation mechanisms, but many also include specific
provisions requiring that courts provide their reasoning and allow
dissents. By revealing the distribution of the judges’ opinions and
their justifications for how individual points should be resolved—
which does not occur with courts that only issue unanimous
decisions—it makes it possible to observe the doctrinal paradox. In
other words, these courts have put the conditions that make the



procedures used by international judicial bodies while also exploring the factors
that drive those differences.
103
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 55, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
104
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, art. 16(1), (3), LXXXV [85th] Regular Period of Sessions, Nov. 16–
28, 2009, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/reglamento.cfm.
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doctrinal paradox possible in place, but have not issued clear
guidance on how it should be resolved.105
Finally, surveying international courts in this way makes it
clear that there is a great deal of variance in the procedures
adopted by international courts, but that the implications of this
variance has not yet been fully explored. Although we have only
considered judgment aggregation, future research should continue
to explore how these differences in procedures impact
international litigation and the development of international law
along a range of dimensions.
3.2. The Conditions Necessary for the Doctrinal Paradox &
International Adjudication
There has unfortunately been relatively little theoretical or
empirical research into the conditions that give rise to occurrences
of the doctrinal paradox in the course of international adjudication.
To review, the doctrinal paradox arises when multiple judges hold
a distribution of opinions that do not result in a consistent majority
view on how the individual components and overall outcome of
the case should be decided. As we argue in this part, the
conditions necessary for this situation to materialize are all present
in international courts and tribunals. Specifically, international
judges and arbitrators have shown their willingness to file separate
and dissenting opinions to express their views, and the evolution
of international law and judicial bodies has created an
environment that makes occurrences of the doctrinal paradox a
distinct possibility.
The first reason that the doctrinal paradox may occur in
international settings is that concurring and dissenting opinions
are often filed. This is significant because a requirement of the
doctrinal paradox is that adjudicators hold differing opinions on
how a case should be decided. The willingness and ability of
judges to file separate opinions is thus a necessary condition for the
doctrinal paradox to manifest itself in judicial decisions. It is then
significant that there is a long history of judges penning separate
opinions in transnational court decisions. For example, of the
twelve advisory opinions that the International Court of Justice
issued in its first twenty years of operation, only one was


105

For a lenghtier discussion on “observable” instances of the doctrinal
paradox, see infra Section 4.1.
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unanimous.106
Despite this history of active dissent, the
phenomenon has been largely overlooked in comparative
international legal scholarship that analyzes the characteristics of
transnational courts. In fact, there have not yet been any articles or
studies that have comprehensively examined dissent rates in
international courts.
Therefore, in order to examine the phenomenon more fully, we
collected data on the rate at which separate opinions, whether
concurring or dissenting, have been filed in the course of
adjudication by judges serving on international courts and
tribunals. Figure 1 employs data from a variety of sources to show
the rates at which separate opinions were filed for six prominent
international judicial bodies: the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”),107 the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”),108 the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”),109 the International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”),110 the Iran-United


106

See R. P. Anand, The Role of Individual and Dissenting Opinions in
International Adjudication, 14 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 788, 788 (1965) (noting that in the
first twenty years of the ICJ’s existence, “of the twenty-nine judgments or orders
delivered by the [ICJ] in twenty-one contentious cases since 1945, only four
judgments were unanimous, and out of twelve advisory opinions handed over
during this period only one opinion was given by an undivided Court”) (internal
citations omitted).
107
The ICJ data is from a dataset collected by Eric Posner & Miguel de
Figuerideo of the seventy-six cases heard by the ICJ through 2003 where judges
voted on “substantive issues.” Eric A. Posner & Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Is the
International Court of Justice Biased?, 34 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 599, 605 (2005). For the
complete dataset, see International Court of Justice, INT’L COURTS DATA,
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/ICdata_files/Page580.htm
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2012) (click on “data” hyperlink to download).
108
The ECJ has not had a single dissenting opinion filed to date. See Vlad
Perju, Reason and Authority in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307, 309
(2009) (“The ECJ finds itself alone among supranational and international courts
and one of only a handful of national apex courts that bans its judges from writing
concurring or dissenting opinions.”).
109
The ECtHR data is based on Erik Voeten’s dataset collected from the 1,163
cases heard between 1960 and 2006 that were deemed by the ECtHR to be of the
highest level of importance. The cases in “importance level 1 are deemed to make
a significant contribution to the development of case law.” Erik Voeten, supra
note 79, at 425. For the complete dataset, see European Court of Human Rights,
INT’L
COURTS
DATA,
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/ev42/ICdata_files/Page364.htm
(last
visited Oct. 17, 2012) (click on “SPSS” or “STATA” hyperlink to download in
different formats).
110
The ICSID data was collected by the authors. The rate is based on twentytwo separate opinions filed in the 330 publicly available ICSID decisions and
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States Claims Tribunal (“IUSCT”),111 and the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”).112 As a point of comparison, Figure 1 also
includes data on the United States Supreme Court (“US SC”)113 and
Federal Courts of Appeals (“US COA”).114 The figure reports the
percent of decisions that include at least one separately filed
dissenting or concurring opinion for the sample analyzed for each
court.



awards. The list of decisions is available at Search Online Decisions and Awards,
ICSID,
https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&reqFrom=Main&actionVal=OnlineAward (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
111
The IUSCT data was collected by the authors. The rate is based on twenty
separate opinions filed in the 133 published IUSCT decisions through 2004. The
list of decisions is available at General Documents: Tribunal Awards and Decisions,
IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL, http://www.iusct.net/Pages/Public/ADocuments.aspx (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
112
The WTO data was collected by Meredith Kolsky Lewis. It shows that, of
105 panel decisions made through 2006, only six dissenting opinions have been
filed. See Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Lack of Dissent in WTO Dispute Settlement, 9
J. INT’L ECON. L. 895, 899 nn.15–20 (2006) (listing the WTO cases in which
dissenting opinions have been filed).
113
The United States Supreme Court data is based on the decisions issued in
the 2005 through 2010 terms. During this period, the Supreme Court issued 476
decisions, of which 336 had either concurrences or dissents filed. The data was
collected from the Harvard Law Review Statistics 2006–2011. See The Statistics,
The Supreme Court, 2010 Term, 125 HARV. L. REV. 362, 367 (2011); The Statistics, The
Supreme Court, 2009 Term, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 416 (2010); The Statistics, The
Supreme Court, 2008 Term, 123 HARV. L. REV. 382, 387 (2009); The Statistics, The
Supreme Court, 2007 Term, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 521 (2008); The Statistics, The
Supreme Court, 2005 Term, 120 HARV. L. REV. 372, 377 (2006). For an analysis of
Supreme Court decisions that looks only at dissent rates and not concurrences, see
Lee Epstein, William M. Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges
Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 106, 106 n.9
(2011) (finding that between 1990 and 2007, there was a dissent rate of 62 percent
in Supreme Court cases).
114
The Court of Appeals data is based on 339 cases with dissents or
concurrences in the sample of 2160 cases in the “U.S. Court of Appeals database”
heard between 1997 and 2002. For the complete dataset, see U.S. Court of Appeals
Database Project, http://www.wmich.edu/nsf-coa/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012)
(click on “Court of Appeals Database” hyperlink for download options). It is
important to note that this dataset is not taken from the total universe of cases
heard during this time period, but instead samples cases from each circuit to
facilitate cross-circuit analysis. For another analysis of dissents, excluding
concurrences, in the United States courts of appeals, see Epstein, Landes, &
Posner, supra note 113 (finding that there was a 2.6 percent dissent rate in courts
of appeals between 1990 and 1970, and a 7.8 percent dissent rate between 1989
and 1991 based on a separate analysis of a sample of 1,025 published decisions).
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As Figure 1 shows, although there is a great deal of variance,
judges and arbitrators on many international bodies can and do file
separate opinions.115 On the extremes, the ICJ had at least one
separate opinion filed in 95% of contentious cases through 2003,
while the European Court of Justice has never delivered an opinion
that was not unanimous. Additionally, although the jurists
presiding over cases brought before ICSID and the WTO have only
issued separate opinions in 7% and 5% of cases, respectively, the
ECtHR (53%) and IUSCT (23%) both have fewer unanimous
opinions than the United States Courts of Appeals (16%).
Moreover, these often are very fractured decisions with multiple
concurrences and dissents, conditions that are conducive to


115

It is worth noting that many domestic courts in other countries do not
allow dissenting opinions. See, e.g., HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 67 (1982) (“In some countries,
such as Belgium, France and Germany, only one judgment is delivered and there
is no indication whether the judgment is given unanimously or by majority.”).
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doctrinal paradox.116 The important takeaway is that judges in
transnational courts often hold differing views in a case, and that if
the doctrinal paradox is a concern to scholars of jurisprudence in
the United States, international scholars should also take note of
the possibility of this phenomena occurring.
A second reason that the doctrinal paradox might be likely to
occur in international settings is that judges may have divergent
views on issues because of the possibility of relationships between
the judges and litigants that do not exist in domestic settings. One
unique feature of international law is that treaties establishing
international courts and tribunals often explicitly allow judges to
hear cases in which their home country is a litigant. For example,
Article 31 of the ICJ Statute provides: “Judges of the nationality of
each of the parties shall retain their right to sit in the case before
the Court.”117 Moreover, the Statute also explicitly provides that a
country appearing before the court may appoint a judge to the
panel deciding its case if no judge of its nationality is already
present.118 Of course, judges in domestic settings may hear cases in
which they have preexisting biases, but in the international setting,
steps are taken to guarantee participation in cases where the judge
may have a strong potential for bias. Emerging empirical research
suggests this does in fact occur: judges are biased towards the
countries that appoint them. For example, Eric Posner and Miguel
de Figueiredo have presented evidence of judges voting to support
their home countries at the ICJ,119 and Erik Voeten has presented
evidence to suggest that there are similar biases towards a judge’s
home country in the European Court of Human Rights.120 This is
perhaps unsurprising since judges often serve for relatively short


116

See, e.g., K. R. Simmonds, The Interhandel Case, 10 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 495
(1961) (providing an example of a contentious decision argued in the International
Court of Justice).
117
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 31, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
1055, 3 Bevans 1179.
118
Id. (“If the Court includes upon the Bench no judge of the nationality of
the contesting parties, each of these parties may proceed to choose a judge as
provided in paragraph (2) of this Article.”).
119
See Posner & Figueiredo, supra note 107, at 601 (using “sophisticated
empirical tests . . . to show that, in fact, judges are significantly biased in favor of
their home states when that state appears as a party” before the ICJ).
120
See Voeten, supra note 79, at 417 (“There is some evidence that career
insecurities make judges more likely to favor their national government when it is
a party to a dispute.”).
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terms on international courts, and their career interests make it
necessary to stay in the good graces of the governments and actors
that appointed them.121 It is worth noting that this feature of
international adjudication is not entirely without merit, as it helps
ensure that countries are willing to submit to the jurisdiction of
international courts. That said, the implication of national bias by
judges is that, compared to domestic settings, there is an increased
possibility that international judges on multi-member courts will
have divergent views on how cases should be resolved in both the
component issues and the final outcome.
A third reason that international adjudication is fertile ground
for the doctrinal paradox is that, although the density of
international law is increasing, in many areas international law still
remains under-developed. As previously noted, there has been a
dramatic proliferation in the number of international judicial
courts and tribunals in the last sixty years.122 At the same time,
there has been a proliferation of international laws,123 as the
expansion of international institutions has led to a corresponding
growth in the legislative and regulatory activities that these
organizations undertake.124 The result is an increasingly complex
web of laws governing a range of international interactions,
including entirely new areas that were previously untouched by
international law.125 International courts and tribunals are thus



121
See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification—The Agency
Problem, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 333, 337 (2002) (“Knowing that they can be replaced, the
members of the [international courts and tribunals] have an incentive not to do
anything that will upset the countries with nominating authority.”).
122
See supra text accompanying notes 77–81 (indicating that international
courts have multiplied and gained more prominence since World War II); see also
Symposium, The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle,
31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 679 (1999) (investigating the different factors leading to
the proliferation of international judicial bodies and the implications of having
numerous international courts).
123
See, e.g., William Ewald, The Complexity of Sources of Transnational Law:
United States Report, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 59, 63–66 (2010).
124
Curtis A. Bradley & Judith G. Kelley, The Concept of International
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 35 (2008) (noting that international
institutions “increasingly engage in a variety of legislative and regulatory
activities”).
125
See, e.g., Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52
HARV. INT’L L.J. 322 (2011) (discussing international law’s increasing emphasis to
regulate individuals); CHRISTINA L. DAVIS, WHY ADJUDICATE? ENFORCING TRADE
RULES IN THE WTO (forthcoming 2012) (enumerating a variety of ways that global
trade law has become more complex); Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors
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charged with interpreting and applying a dizzying body of
international law that comes from a range of domestic and
international sources. The judges on these courts, however, have
relatively little precedent to help guide their decisions as they
wade into uncharted areas of international adjudication. Judges
therefore may find it difficult to determine which component
issues are critical to decide en route to a final judgment, which
impacts judgment aggregation if the judges choose to employ
issue-based voting.126 In addition, even if the judges can easily
agree on which legal and factual issues they should be deciding as
part of a case, there are fewer previous cases to guide them on how
they should rule on the various issues. The result is that, with few
precedents and messy law to guide judgments, it is likely that the
judges will have a wide distribution of views on any given issue.
The lack of precedent thus directly affects the likelihood that the
distribution of votes in a case will result in the occurrence of the
doctrinal paradox.
A fourth reason that international judicial bodies may facilitate
the occurrence of the doctrinal paradox is that the procedures of
international courts are often still poorly developed. Given how
rapidly many of these courts have been created and how
infrequently many have been used, a large number of international
courts and tribunals remain “in their early stages of
development.”127 Notably, this is true of the procedures that the
courts use to decide contentious cases. As a result, when
contentious situations arise in international courts—when there are
divergent majorities for the different propositions that the court
has to consider—there is unlikely to be established policies for
refereeing the disputes. Thus, if the conditions that create the
doctrinal paradox do arise, international courts are particularly
unlikely to have thought through how best to evaluate the various
sub-issues pertinent to the decision and then decide on an overall
outcome to the case. This stands in contrast to domestic courts of
appeals in the United States, where internal policies and



and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty Arbitration System, 107 AM. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2013) (on file with the authors) (discussing the evolution of
international investment law).
126
See infra Section 5.1 (examining the merits of flexible aggregation
procedures in resolving the doctrinal paradox).
127
Alter, supra note 79, at 3.
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procedures for deciding cases have evolved over decades. In other
words, these infant institutions are susceptible to indeterminate
decision-making procedures because they lack clear policies for
consistent judgment aggregation.
3.3. Resolving Indeterminacy in International Adjudication
As we have argued, the conditions necessary for the doctrinal
paradox to occur are present in a range of transnational judicial
bodies. If the doctrinal paradox were to occur, however, it does
not mean that the court would fail to reach a decision. Instead,
when cases give rise to the doctrinal paradox in an international
court or tribunal that does not have a formal judgment aggregation
policy,128 the judges on the court are left with one of two options.
The first option is that the court could adopt an ad hoc policy to
resolve the case each time the doctrinal paradox occurs. The
second option is that courts could implement a de facto judgment
aggregation system that the members of the court have either
explicitly or implicitly adopted. In this option, the members of the
court may or may not be aware that they have selected a judgment
aggregation policy, and instead simply always defer to one of the
two judgment aggregation methods. Both of the two options have
advantages and disadvantages that should be considered by the
diplomats, scholars, and activists that design international legal
institutions.
Although it may appear on its face that adopting an ad hoc
aggregation system when the doctrinal paradox arises is the
simplest approach, doing so does have associated costs that should
be considered. In any setting, whether domestic or international,
allowing judges to form ad hoc decisions on how to aggregate
decisions after a paradoxical result raises concerns.129 The obvious
concern is that by failing to have a consistent judgment
aggregation policy, there is a possibility that like cases might not
be treated alike. In other words, if the exact same set of facts were
to appear in front of the same set of judges in the future, the result


128

See supra text accompanying notes 99–105 (arguing that the major
permanent international courts and tribunals do not have formal judgment
aggregation policies that were established by treaties); see also Appendix, infra.
129
For a discussion of proposals that suggest a form of ad hoc voting, see
infra Section 5.3.
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of the case could be different if the judgment aggregation system
were not consistent over time.130
In international settings, however, there is another factor
associated with ad hoc policymaking that should also be
considered. Previous scholarship on international institutions has
noted that both formal and informal policies and norms often
develop in international bodies.131 This scholarship argues that
international organizations have a myriad of explicitly stated and
negotiated formal rules that govern the operation of those
institutions. In addition to these formal rules, there are often also
informal rules that are not part of the official standard operating
procedure of the organization. Although there are certainly
advantages to having two parallel sets of rules governing
international institutions, informal rules “allow exceptional access
for powerful states to set the agenda and control particular
outcomes.”132 In other words, when there is not an explicit policy
on the books for how to resolve an issue, powerful actors are
frequently able to exercise influence to ensure that their views are
given primacy.133
This feature of international organizations poses the risk of
biasing outcomes in favor of powerful countries if courts adopt an



130
See Kornhauser, supra note 41, at 12 (arguing that treating similar cases
alike “imposes a consistency requirement on judicial decisions” and “reasongiving promotes this consistency by characterizing each case and identifying the
legally relevant aspects of similarity across cases”).
131
See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International
Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421, 422–23 (2000) (arguing that norms serve as a form
of soft international law that is often preferable to hard international law codified
through legalization); Barbara Koremenos et al., The Rational Design of International
Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761, 762 (2001) (stating that while norms play an
important role in international organizations, these organizations are primarily
shaped by the interests of states). See generally RANDALL W. STONE, CONTROLLING
INSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY xi (2011)
(developing a theory of informal governance to explain “essential features of the
politics of diverse international organizations”).
132
STONE, supra note 131, at 13. See also Randall W. Stone, The Scope of IMF
Conditionality, 62 INT’L ORG. 589, 590 (2008) (developing a theory of informal rules
in the International Monetary Fund where “formal rules . . . embody consensual
procedures, and informal rules . . . allow exceptional access for powerful
countries”).
133
For a discussion of the benefits of having formal and informal
international agreements in the context of international organizations, see
generally Jacob Katz Cogan, Representation and Power in International Organizations:
The Operational Constitution and Its Critics, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 209 (2009).
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ad hoc policy when confronted with cases that fit the doctrinal
paradox. Formal rules dictate the number of judges on courts, the
selection mechanism to choose those judges, and the scope of the
court’s jurisdiction.134 How to aggregate a judgment in the absence
of an established policy when a paradoxical result has occurred,
however, is an informal decision. Therefore, it matters that power
in international courts is not evenly distributed,135 and allowing
this ad hoc decision process by a tribunal introduces a new way by
which powerful states have the potential to influence the outcomes
of international adjudication.136 In other words, even if every
aspect of a case were fairly and impartially decided, if it leads to
the doctrinal paradox, powerful states may be more likely to have
the ultimate disposition of the case go their way when there is not
a formal judgment aggregation rule on the books.
Given the costs associated with the ad hoc policy described
above, it is tempting to conclude that option two, the consistent
implementation of a specific judgment aggregation policy, is the
better policy. Unfortunately, this policy has drawbacks as well.
For one reason, there are tradeoffs associated with the different
judgment aggregation methods when a doctrinal paradox arises.137
For example, using issue-based voting might expend greater
resources while using outcome-based voting might produce less
useful precedent. The concern with the court deciding how to
weigh these tradeoffs on an informal basis is that even if the choice
made is the same as the one that diplomats would have negotiated
in advance, there is good reason to think that there is a troubling
democratic deficit in international organizations.138 Since adopting
a judgment aggregation mechanism might have predictable
implications for future litigation before the court, regardless of the
policy adopted, it could still be troubling if members of the court


134

For a discussion of the formal rules of international courts and tribunals,
see generally Romano, supra note 1.
135
Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45
VA. J. INT’L L. 631, 634 (2005) (“The ability to constrain international courts is
differentially distributed in the international system, so that more powerful states
are able to exercise greater control over tribunals.”).
136
Stone, supra note 81, at 58 (“International courts act strategically to protect
their long-term influence, so they accommodate powerful interest groups.”).
137
See infra Sections 5.1 and 5.2
138
For an overview of the “democratic deficit” debate in international
relations, see generally Andrew Moravcsik, Is there a ‘Democratic Deficit’ in World
Politics? A Framework for Analysis, 39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 336 (2004).
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chose to adopt the policy without the potential for direct
deliberation by the states that would be subject to the jurisdiction
of the court.
3.4. The Consequences of Indeterminacy in International Adjudication
As we have argued, insufficient attention has been paid to the
possibility of the doctrinal paradox occurring in international
settings. Moreover, there are numerous reasons to believe that the
conditions necessary for the doctrinal paradox occur in
international adjudication, and allowing international courts and
tribunals to decide between two defensible outcomes creates
problems that are not present in domestic settings. This is true for
at least two reasons. First, in international adjudication, states
have the ability to refuse to comply with judicial decisions, an
option that is not as readily available in domestic settings where
the executive and judicial branch can enforce decisions. Second,
international legal decisions have a particularly important role in
communicating and establishing the corpus of international law.
The first reason that the doctrinal paradox is a greater threat to
judicial adjudication in international settings than in domestic
settings is that litigants are often able to refuse to comply with
international courts’ judgments.139 Trying to determine the rates at
which states comply with international legal obligations has been a
source of major debate over the last twenty years.140 In the face of
this debate, legal scholars have put forward numerous theories to
explain why states may or may not choose to comply with
international law when they feel that the action required to comply
with the judgment is not in their immediate interest.141 One of the


139

See Ginsburg, supra note 135, at 660 (“States in some cases simply can
ignore the decision of an international court.”).
140
Compare Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, On Compliance, 47
INT’L ORG. 175, 204 (1993) (arguing that noncompliance is a deviant behavior and
for a de-emphasis on formal enforcement of international agreements), with
George W. Downs et al., Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About
Cooperation?, 50 INT’L ORG. 379, 379–80 (1996) (rejecting scholars’ claims that high
compliance rates is evidence that enforcement is not the best means of obtaining
compliance with international agreements). For a general discussion of the
contours of this debate, see Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, International
Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
141
See, e.g., GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 97 (exploring many theories
behind compliance with international law, such as state interest and moral
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prominent explanations holds that states use non-compliance with
international judicial decisions to express their displeasure with
the judgments with which they disagree.142 Moreover, there is a
growing collection of empirical literature using quantitative
methods to analyze compliance with a range of issues in
international law, including international economic agreements,143
human rights law,144 environmental regulations,145 and the laws of
war.146 Of course, in the case of international adjudication, it is



obligation); Jacob Katz Cogan, Noncompliance and the International Rule of Law, 31
YALE J. INT’L L. 189, 191 (2006) (claiming that by “reconciling formal legal
prescriptions with changing community policies or by bridging the enforcement
gap created by inadequate community mechanisms of control” states commit
“operational noncompliance”—formally breaching international law but
preserving a partially effective regime); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based
Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002) (arguing that rational, selfinterested states comply with international law due to concerns over their
reputation amongst other states); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2603 (1997) (“[T]his overlooked process of
interaction, interpretation, and internalization of international norms into
domestic legal systems is pivotal to understanding why nations ‘obey’
international law . . . .”).
142
See Ginsburg, supra note 135, at 660 (noting that when a state ignores the
decision of an international court, that it “is at bottom a communicative act
expressing displeasure with a court ruling”).
143
See, e.g., Beth A. Simmons, International Law and State Behavior: Commitment
and Compliance in International Monetary Affairs, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 819 (2000)
(showing that reputational concerns and competitive market pressures serve as a
more effective form of generating compliance with international economic
agreements); Beth A. Simmons, Money and Law: Why Comply with the Public
International Law of Money?, 25 YALE J. INT’L L. 323 (2000) (demonstrating that
states comply with the public international law of money to increase international
trade, which allows the market to serve as an effective enforcement mechanism).
144
See, e.g., BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS (2009) (using case studies and statistical analysis to
show that human rights practices improve following the ratification of human
rights treaties); Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
111 YALE L.J. 1935, 1939 (2002) (analyzing 166 nations over forty years and
determining that noncompliance with human rights treaties is common).
145
See, e.g., Xinyuan Dai, Why Comply? The Domestic Constituency Mechanism,
59 INT’L ORG. 363 (2005) (presenting findings regarding the effects of domestic
constituency on the compliance decisions of governments under the auspices of
the European acid rain regime).
146
See James D. Morrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 559, 561 (2007) (finding that treaty ratification increases compliance with
the laws of war for democratic but not autocratic nations); Benjamin Valentino et
al., Covenants Without the Sword: International Law and the Protection of Civilians in
Times of War, 58 WORLD POL. 339 (2006) (studying the effectiveness of international
laws prohibiting attacks on civilians in times of war).
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often extremely difficult to conclusively determine whether states
are complying with court judgments.147 This is true for a variety of
reasons, including the fact that states can simply ignore
international courts in covert ways, that states may drag their feet
for years before complying, or because there may be selection
effects that limit the number of politically sensitive cases that reach
courts.148 There is strong reason to believe, however, that courts
frequently encounter difficulty in enforcing their judgments, as the
rates of non-compliance described in the literature suggest.149
Courts might also alter their decisions, seeking to avoid noncompliance.150 Hence, an international tribunal’s vote distribution
in a case might encourage its judges to justify a decision for one
party—the very situation that arises in the doctrinal paradox. If so,
then the tribunal might choose an outcome aimed at minimizing
the likelihood of non-compliance. In other words, the court might
decide for the party who threatens it most. In extreme cases, a
state could choose to exit if it believes that a tribunal reached its
decision ad hoc and unfairly.151 Exit from international institutions
is rare and an unlikely response to the doctrinal paradox.152 Still,
the possibility for exit highlights how the stakes of indeterminacy
during decision-making rise in international settings.


147

See Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 28 (“[C]ompliance [with international
courts] can be hard to observe . . . .”).
148 See id.
149
See LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION 50–94 (2002) (arguing that European courts encounter difficulty enforcing
their judgments).
150
For an empirical analysis of the non-compliance phenomenon in the
European Court of Justice, see Clifford J. Carrubba et al., Judicial Behavior under
Political Constraints: Evidence from the European Court of Justice, 102 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 435, 449 (2008) (“[T]hreats of noncompliance and legislative override induce
courts to alter their decisions to mollify those political interests responsible for
compliance and legislation.”); see also Clifford J. Carrubba, Courts and Compliance
in International Regulatory Regimes, 67 J. POL. 669, 687 (2005) (discussing how
“international courts can help overcome problems of enforcement in international
agreements”).
151
See Jacob Katz Cogan, Competition and Control in International Adjudication,
48 VA. J. INT’L L. 411, 424 (2008) (“[A] State, having previously consented to a
court’s jurisdiction or to a treaty regime, usually may exit.”).
152
But see Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1602 (2005)
(“[D]enunciations and withdrawals are a regularized component of modern treaty
practice—acts that are infrequent but hardly the isolated or aberrant events that
the conventional wisdom suggests.”).

Ͳʹ

Ǧ  ȋ ȌȋȌ

ʹͲͳʹȐ

DOCTRINALPARADOX

ͳȀͳͺȀʹͲͳ͵ͷǣʹͶ

ͳͳͳ


Another consequence of international cases that produce the
doctrinal paradox is that their decisions do not effectively
communicate information important to the development of
international law.153 International courts and tribunals play a
primary role disseminating information on international law,
including to other courts and tribunals on how futures cases
should be decided and to practitioners on how to advise states and
litigants.154 The clearly articulated rationales of majority decisions
and clarifications and arguments presented in separate and
dissenting
opinions
provide
the
channels
for
such
communication.155 This communication, however, loses usefulness
when opinions are confusing because the decisions on component
issues do not match the final judgment. Scholars have expressed
concern that such fragmentation hinders the development of
international law.156 Examples of the doctrinal paradox create a
problem for international courts because they risk creating unclear
and unusable information for future courts and litigants. These
decisions confuse instead of clarify the corpus of international
law.157



153 Although legal precedents might peripherally affect civil law legal
systems, they occupy central importance in common law countries. Precedent is
arguably of particular importance to international law because of the relatively
few cases that result in judicial decisions.
154
See GUZMAN, supra note 97, at 51 (“Recognizing that international courts
serve almost exclusively to provide information changes the way one views and
evaluates them.”).
155
For an argument that dissenting and separate opinions serve an important
role in generating discussion on international courts that shape future decisions
and law, see CHESTER BROWN, A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
55–65 (2007); see also LAUTERPACHT, supra note 115, at 66 (“[T]he individual
Opinions of the Judges . . . facilitate the fulfillment of the indirect purpose of the
[ICJ], which is to develop and to clarify international law.”).
156
See, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the
International Law Commission, 58th sess, May 1–June 9, July 3–Aug 11, 2006,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (Apr. 3, 2006) (Martti Koskenniemi) (detailing how
erosion of general international law and increasingly specialized law-making lead
to conflicts between rules and rule-making).
157 Increasing uncertainty about the status and content of international law
also risks increasing the number of cases that proceed to litigation. Prior judicial
rulings can help to clarify the likely disposition of legal disputes if they were to be
litigated, but unclear rulings can increase uncertainty, thereby encouraging
litigation.
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4. THE PARADOX DURING INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION
The staggering number of the different bodies and processes of
international adjudication presents one of its most striking
features.158 One of the most salient features of the doctrinal
paradox is its occurrence in any collective decision-making body
that is required to make multiple connected judgments.159
Although previous scholarship glosses over the unique features of
the different settings in which the paradox can occur, a full
appreciation of its scope and implications necessitates examining
these features more closely. So the general features of the doctrinal
paradox in international settings discussed in Section 3 will be
focused in Section 4 on three increasingly important areas of
international adjudication: human rights, adjudication of complex
scientific issues, and arbitration. By doing so, we hope to illustrate
how the indeterminacy caused by the doctrinal paradox relates to
scholars and practitioners working across different branches of
international law.
This Section proceeds in four parts. First, we address how the
doctrinal paradox can occur whether it is observable or not. By
highlighting this distinction, we are able to fully explain our
approach for identifying examples of when there is a possibility of
the doctrinal paradox occurring in international adjudication.
Second, we describe a case from the European Court of Human
Rights where the doctrinal paradox occurred. This case illustrates
how judges on the world’s most active international court issued
judgments that led to a paradoxical result. Third, we explain the
increasing frequency with which international panels must make
judgments that hinge on contested scientific information and how
this can create difficulties in aggregating judgments or providing
coherent case law for the future. Given the complexity and
uncertainty of the decisions made over multiple issues, the
possibility exists that these conditions will lead to logically
inconsistent outcomes. Finally, we discuss how the adoption of
new practices in international adjudication has created the
opportunity for the doctrinal paradox to arise. Although the
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For a survey of the different forms of international dispute settlement, see
generally J. G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (5th ed. 2011).
159
See List & Polak, supra note 19, at 442 (discussing judicial panels, multimember academic job-search committees, and scientific expert panels aggregating
individual members’ preferences into collective decisions).
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policies of traditional arbitration panels made the doctrinal
paradox unlikely, the creation of permanent arbitration panels like
ICSID, which publishes dissenting opinions, makes such forums
fertile grounds for indeterminate decision-making.
4.1. Strategy for Locating the Doctrinal Paradox Internationally
Scholars interested in the doctrinal paradox face the challenge
of showing that it is more than a mere possibility and actually
appears in the decision-making of multi-member courts. But even
if a published decision makes clear that a different voting
procedure would have produced a different decision, reading
through the huge number of any court’s published decisions to
identify the paradox poses practical difficulties.
A more interesting challenge is that the doctrinal paradox often
does not reveal itself in published decisions.160 Even if the
distribution of judgments causes a doctrinal paradox, individual
judges can obscure their opinions, concealing the paradox.
Specifically, at least three reasons justify why the paradox likely
passes unobserved even during judicial adjudication. First, judges
can change their votes on a component issue so that even if the
distribution of judgments in a case would have created an
indeterminate result, the published decision appears logically
consistent across the issues and outcomes. In the earlier examples
of the doctrinal paradox on the U.S. Supreme Court, the paradox
was observable because a judge explained that he changed his vote
on the final outcome because he did not want the decision to be
inconsistent with the votes of the individual issues addressed in
the case.161 If, however, the judge changed his vote on a
component issue instead of on the case’s outcome, it would have
been impossible to discern that the doctrinal paradox had occurred
during the decision-making process (unless the judge specifically
explained his actions in a concurring opinion or it was later
revealed when the Justice’s papers were released).
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Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 748
(“[C]onflict seldom is revealed in published appellate court opinions. This is not
surprising, however, because when courts engage in outcome voting, the judges
in the majority typically do not reveal their views on issues that they ‘do not need
to reach’ in order to vote for or against a particular outcome.”).
161
See supra text accompanying notes 51–54.
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Second, the doctrinal paradox might go unobserved because of
great variation in the rate at which judges release dissenting or
separate opinions.162 Third, judges facing the doctrinal paradox
might not spend time dwelling on the quandary. They might
simply issue an opinion explaining how they agreed to resolve the
case without discussing their different views on component
issues.163
The international context adds to these problems. First,
instances of the doctrinal paradox in international settings are
difficult to locate and analyze even when observable since many
tribunals issue complex and long decisions across formats,
languages, and databases. Second, international courts vary highly
in whether they publish the justifications of their decisions and in
whether dissents are issued in non-unanimous decisions.164 The
lack of a clear statement of reasoning and of dissents makes it
nearly impossible to identify instances of the doctrinal paradox.
Indeed, even if researchers could readily access the decisions of
every international tribunal, the doctrinal paradox is more likely to
be unobserved internationally than in the U.S., where courts
usually explain their reasoning and publish dissenting opinions.
Hence, our strategy of identifying instances of the doctrinal
paradox considers how it could arise within the specific contours
of three different types of international adjudication. For this
effort, we selected forms of international adjudication that met
three criteria. First, the form of adjudication must be used
frequently in international law.
Since many international
adjudicatory bodies are seldom used, it makes sense to show how
this paradox arises in the forums that actually have active dockets.
Second, the issues must form part of an important and growing
area of international law. After all, the stakes of the doctrinal
paradox would be minimal if it was only likely to occur during the
adjudication of issues tangential to the core of the international
legal project. Third, we discuss forms of adjudication that cover a
wide range of legal issues. By examining the selected cases, we
demonstrate that the doctrinal paradox poses implications for legal
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See supra text accompanying notes 106–116.
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 12 (“Judges who have
encountered the doctrinal paradox in the course of their collective adjudicative
efforts have barely paused to reflect on their quandary.”).
164
See supra Sections 3.1 and 3.2; see also Appendix, infra.
163
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scholars and practitioners interested in topics ranging from human
rights to environmental protection to investor protection. Through
the discussion of three distinct methods of dispute settlement, we
show that the doctrinal paradox should be both of general interest
and practical importance to many aspects of international
adjudication.
4.2. Permanent International Courts
It would be reasonable to believe that the doctrinal paradox is
more likely to occur on a very active court; in international
adjudication, the most active court is the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”).165 The ECtHR is a transnational court
that hears suits brought by individual plaintiffs claiming that their
government violated one or more of their rights protected by the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“European Convention on Human Rights”) of 1950.166
Although, of the tremendous number of suits filed with the Court,
the majority are dismissed before reaching argument, the seven
percent of cases that reach trial are heard by a panel of seven
judges, including a judge from the country of the plaintiff who
brought the case.167 The panel then issues a decision, which may
include dissents, and a detailed explanation of the judges’
reasoning. Since the ECtHR has issued more than seven thousand
opinions through this process, the court has become one of the
most respected international legal institutions.168
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See Voeten, supra note 2, at 671 (the ECtHR “has by far the largest caseload
of any international court”).
166
See Council of Europe, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 14, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. No. 5,
213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights]. For an
excellent and concise summary on the ECtHR, see Voeten, supra note 79, at 418–
19. Note that “a few interstate cases” have been brought in the ECtHR. Id. at 418,
n.5.
167
See id. at 419.
168
See Laurence R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19
EUR. J. INT’L L. 125, 125 (2008) (“The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is
the crown jewel of the world’s most advanced international system for protecting
civil and political liberties.”); see also id. at 126 (“[T]he Convention and its growing
and diverse body of case law have transformed Europe’s legal and political
landscape, qualifying the ECtHR as the world’s most effective international
human rights tribunal.”).
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The decision in Fretté v. France, issued by the ECtHR, meets the
conditions of the doctrinal paradox.169 The case concerned whether
a French court’s decision to uphold the denial of an adoption by a
single gay man violated his right of equal treatment under the
European Convention on Human Rights. Although the court had
to decide several issues in making its final determination, the core
controversy surrounded two issues. The first issue concerned
whether Article 14 of the Convention applied. Article 14 provides
that the “enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this
convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground
. . . .”170 If Article 14 applied, the second issue addressed whether
the decision to deny the plaintiff the right to adopt constituted
discrimination. A “yes” to both questions was necessary to issue a
finding that the French government had violated the plaintiff’s
rights under the Convention.

Bratza
Costa
Fuhrmann
Jungwiert
Kuris
Traja
Tulkens
Outcome

Fretté v. France
Article 14
Discrimination?
Applicable?
Yes
Yes
No
Not Decided
Yes
Yes
No
Not Decided
Yes
No
No
Not Decided
Yes
Yes
4–3
3–1

Violation of
Article 14?
Yes
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
3–4

The decision in Fretté ultimately concluded that Article 14 of
the Convention did apply, but that that case did not exhibit



169
Fretté v. France, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. 438 (2002). In an article on the adoption
laws of the European Union, George Letsas mentions this case as an example of
the doctrinal paradox. George Letsas, No Human Right to Adopt?, 1 UCL HUM. RTS.
REV. 134, 137 (2008).
170
European Convention on Human Rights, art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the
rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”).
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discrimination constituting a violation of Article 14.171 The
outcome thus found for the defendant, the French government.
Only a single judge, however, adopted this reasoning. Judge Kuris
wrote the opinion for the court, explaining the reasoning behind its
decision, but three judges then signed two other opinions. An
interesting result ensued because the three judges who agreed with
Judge Kuris that Article 14 was applicable also voted that Fretté’s
treatment constituted discrimination.
Therefore, France, the
defendant state, prevailed because the three judges who found that
Article 14 did not apply chose not to address the second issue.172
Fretté then resembles the previously discussed Supreme Court case
Arizona v. Fulminante, in which Judge Souter chose not to decide
two of the issues of the case.173 As in Fulminante, it is impossible to
say with certainty what would have happened in Fretté if all seven
judges had voted on each issue. As it stands, the Fretté decision
does not correspond to the distribution of the votes on each
component issue. In other words, the members of the court
applied outcome-based voting to resolve this case.
The partially concurring opinion in Fretté recognized the
decision’s peculiarity. Writing for himself and two other judges
who found that Article 14 did not apply, Judge Costa noted: “The
fundamental paradox of this judgment seems to [be] that it would
have been easier to justify the rejection of the complaint on the
legal basis of the inapplicability of Article 14 than to declare Article
14 applicable and then find no breach of it.”174 Interestingly, Judge
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See Fretté, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 459 [¶ 43] (“[T]he justification given by the
Government appears objective and reasonable and the difference complained of is
not discriminatory for the purposes of Art.14 of the Convention.”).
172
The Partly Concurring Opinion of these three judges notes the difficulty in
resolving whether the adoption denial constituted discrimination, but does not
attempt to conclusively do so because it is unnecessary to determine the final
disposition. See id. at 463–466 (partly concurring opinion of Judge Costa joined by
Judges Jungwiert and Traja).
173
See supra text accompanying notes 53–55; see also Kornhauser & Sager,
supra note 17, at 15 n.36 (stating that when discussing Fulminante, “[o]ne has to
speak in this speculative voice because Justice Souter, curiously, cast an
incomplete roster of votes. He supported the view that the confession was
voluntary, and joined in the conclusion that the harmless error doctrine applied to
the admission of coerced confessions, but he did not take a position on the
question of whether the error in Fulminante would have been harmless and did
not vote on the outcome of the case.”).
174
See Fretté, 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 466 [¶ O-I18] (partly concurring opinion of
Judge Costa joined by Judges Jungwiert and Traja).
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Costa was the French judge,175 and the majority of the judges
disagreed with him on this point, finding that Article 14 did apply.
However, the outcome Judge Costa supported—a finding for the
French government—was the ultimate decision of the court.
Although there is empirical evidence that suggests that judges on
the ECtHR are more likely to support their home government,176
there is no evidence that the result of this case was due to bias
towards France on the part of the panel of judges. That said, the
case does illustrate that the doctrinal paradox can lead to
indeterminacy on the international stage. It also highlights that
having a judge appointed by the defending national government
on the panel raises the possibility that a decision will appear
political in a way that it could not in domestic contexts.
4.3. Scientific Decision-Making by International Panels
Another area where the doctrinal paradox may appear in
international adjudication is in the context of cases in which
scientific information must be considered.177 As the complexity
and density of international laws and regulations have grown,
international adjudicatory bodies have increasingly been called on
to make decisions that involve scientific questions.178 This trend
has forced international adjudicatory bodies to evaluate
sophisticated scientific evidence on topics ranging from how
specific genetically modified organisms impact food safety and
health to the implications that various pollutants have on global
climate change.179 The scientific questions that courts are forced to
consider are often not single discrete points, but instead require
issuing a series of connected judgments on a number of related


175

See Judges of the Court Since 1959, EUR. COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/4DE51198-3FDF-4CD5-82D11704E49A57AB/0/Liste_des_juges_depuis1959_EN.pdf (last accessed Oct. 17,
2012).
176
See Voeten, supra note 79, at 428 (observing the situations where judges
show bias towards their home countries).
177
See, e.g., List & Polak, supra note 19, at 442 (“[C]onsider an expert panel
that is asked to give advice on a set of complex scientific questions.”).
178
See Sungjoon Cho, From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy, and
World Trade Law, 44 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 249, 250 (2011) (“Recently, science has
become increasingly salient in various fields of international law.”).
179
See generally Andrew Green & Tracey Epps, The WTO, Science, and the
Environment: Moving Towards Consistency, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 285 (2007) (exploring
the World Trade Organization’s treatment of issues of “scientific uncertainty”).
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premises en route to reaching a final disposition for the case. The
result is that scientific decision-making by international courts and
tribunals is fertile ground for the doctrinal paradox to arise.
One of the primary reasons that scientific judgments by
adjudicatory bodies are likely to give rise to the doctrinal paradox
is that making scientifically grounded decisions often entails
consideration of a number of related propositions.180 Take global
warming as an example.181 To determine if global warming is
occurring may require a consideration of the current base rate of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, whether the rate is increasing,
the relation of atmospheric carbon dioxide and temperature, and
whether that current increase translates into an increase in average
temperature. More broadly, making scientific determinations often
requires evaluating different forms of scientific evidence across a
range of topics before being able to make a final judgment on a
larger scientific claim.
One difficulty that confounds decision-making on scientific
questions is that there are often substantial scientific uncertainties
in the component issues.182 The nature of these uncertainties can
vary from “risks” (which have a well understood probability
distribution), to Knightian uncertainty (which prevents the
assignment of probabilities over different outcomes), to complete
ignorance (where the range of possible outcomes is not even
known).183 As a consequence, even when using modern statistical
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Cf. JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 189 (1983) (discussing how decision-making on energy use
requires making several related determinations).
181
See Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Arrow’s Theorem in Judgment
Aggregation, 29 SOC. CHOICE & WELFARE 19, 19–20 (2007) (using global warming as
an example to illustrate the discursive dilemma).
182
For a discussion of these issues of scientific uncertainty in the context of
trade law, see Sungjoon Cho, Of the World Trade Court’s Burden, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L.
675, 678 (2009).
183
For further discussion, see Vern Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming
the “World Trans-science Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and
Factfinding in the Growth Hormones Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 255 (1998)
(questioning the WTO’s combination of science and regulation). See also JOHN
HICKS, CAUSALITY IN ECONOMICS (1979); Paul Davidson, Some Misunderstanding on
Uncertainty in Modern Classical Economics, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMIC THOUGHT
21, 34 (Christian Schmidt ed., 1996) (advocating John Keynes’ approach to
uncertainty which requires differentiating uncertainty from risk); Mark Perlman
& Charles R. McCann Jr., Varieties of Uncertainty, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMIC
THOUGHT, supra at 9, 17–18 (exploring sources of uncertainty and methods for
resolving uncertainty).
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techniques, scientific experts can arrive at wildly different
estimates of the amount and impact of uncertainty in a particular
scientific claim.184 Because the predicted point estimates may vary
greatly across studies, the impact of differing methodological and
normative assumptions that inform these analyses is quite high.
Temporarily resolving risk, uncertainty, ignorance, and ambiguity
for the purpose of making public policy or deciding legal claims
thus necessarily requires making assumptions about the behavior
of the physical world.185
The result is that legal decisions requiring scientific judgments
will inevitably face conditions favorable to the doctrinal paradox
because there is the possibility of heterogeneous views on the
resolution of the underlying scientific questions. Simply put, even
with the same information, experts with the same level of
competence will come to different conclusions on scientific
questions. This problem is compounded, however, because the
challenge that faces public policy makers and judges then is not
just a function of the inherent indeterminacy of scientific inquiry,
but also a function of the nature of public policy—there needs to be
some sort of specificity and consistency in the reasons given for a
particular policy or decision. In the context of scientific evidence,
this means that judges need to be able to articulate a clear set of
mechanisms that can demonstrate that a causal process is
underway, thus requiring a policy or legal intervention. Moreover,
in order for some form of harm to be established, there needs to be
a demonstration that the mechanisms that generate the harm
actually operate. As a result, scientific cases that give rise to the
doctrinal paradox are both possible, even when there is solid


184

See, e.g., Andrew Stirling, Risk, Uncertainty and Precaution: Some
Instrumental Implications from the Social Sciences, in NEGOTIATING ENVIRONMENTAL
CHANGE: NEW PERSPECTIVES FROM SOCIAL SCIENCE 33 (Frans Berkhout et al. eds.,
2003) (discussing risk in environmental social science and finding precaution to be
an instrumentality of risk); Andrew Stirling, Risk at a Turning Point?, 1 J. RISK RES.
97, 97 (1998) (examining the subjectivity of comparative risk assessments and the
consequent need for increased public participation in policy making); Andrew
Stirling, Limits to the Value of External Costs, 25 ENERGY POL’Y 517, 517–18 (1997)
(discussing the difficulties of energy risk analysis and its subjective findings).
185
See, e.g., SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS
POLICYMAKERS 9–12 (1990) (analyzing agencies’ growing dependence on scientists
throughout the policy making process); Elster, supra note 180, at 185–207 (arguing
that the risk and uncertainty inherent in energy production must be used as a
basis for choice).
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scientific evidence on the issues in the case, and difficult to resolve,
given the requirement that scientific decisions have logically
consistent causal stories.
The way that these concepts are emerging in international
courts and tribunals is illustrated by the debate on the use of
antibiotics in livestock.186 In addition to their use to treat sick
animals (therapeutic use) and to prevent animals from becoming
sick (prophylactic use), antibiotics can also be used at subtherapeutic levels to speed up the growth rates of livestock
(antibiotic growth promoters, or AGPs).187
Despite these
advantages of antibiotics, however, they may negatively affect
public health by creating bacteria that are resistant to antibiotics.
Determining whether a threat exists to public health hinges on
multiple connected propositions; hence the possibility of judgment
aggregation problems.
To determine whether AGPs pose a threat to public health
involves analysis of a number of component issues, including
dose-response effects (creating a measure of the amount of
resistance produced by using a certain amount of antibiotics), the
effect of other antibiotics and biological phenomena present in
empirical tests of a resistance link, and confirmation of transfer of
resistance genes to resident human bacterial flora which then
interfere in a therapeutic intervention for a human livestock
consumer. If a judge believes that the current use of antibiotics
does produce substantial resistance levels but that it has not been
shown to compromise human therapeutic intervention, then
banning antibiotics on public safety grounds would clearly not be
warranted.
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See generally J. J. Dibner & J. D. Richards, Antibiotic Growth Promoters in
Agriculture: History and Mode of Action, 84 POULTRY SCI. 634 (2005) (discussing the
various responses to the use of antibiotic growth promoter).
187
See W. W. Cravens & G. L. Holck, Economic Benefits to the Livestock Producer
and to the Consumer from the Use of Feed Additives, 31 J. ANIMAL SCI. 1102, 1102
(1970) (examining the economic benefits arising from the use of feed additives); E.
L. R. Stokstad & T. H. Jukes, Further Observations on the “Animal Protein Factor”, 73
PROC. SOC’Y EXPERIMENTAL BIOLOGY & MED. 523, 527 (1950) (tracking the effects of
different diets on animal growth rates); P. R. Moore et al., Use of Sulfasuxidine,
Streptothricin, and Streptomycin in Nutritional Studies with the Chick, 165 J. BIOL.
CHEM. 437, 440 (1946) (exploring the effect of sulfonamides on the nutritional
vitamin requirements of chicks).
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Beginning in 1997, the European Union (“EU”) began banning
AGPs, and by 2006 their use was fully prohibited in Europe.188
During this process, arguments on whether AGPs should be
banned turned on the positions taken on these issues. The EU’s
Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition (“SCAN”) argued that
there was insufficient evidence that antibiotic-resistant bacteria in
animals could be transferred to humans in a way that would
spread resistance mechanisms.189 The EU’s Scientific Steering
Committee (“SSC”), however, decided that transfer was at least
possible.190 These divergent viewpoints reflected disagreement
within the scientific community itself as to whether definitive
demonstration of a biological mechanism is required to affirm a
premise. This disagreement on premises formed an important part
of the challenges to the bans brought by economic interests in the
EU’s Court of First Instance (renamed the General Court in
November 2009). Pfizer, the manufacturer of one of the banned
antibiotics, Virginiamycin, based much of its argument on the need
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See Victoria F. Samanidou & Evaggelia N. Evaggelopoulou,
Chromatographic Analysis of Banned Antibacterial Growth Promoters in Animal Feed, 31
J. SEPARATION SCI. 2091, 2102 (2008) (listing various bans on antibiotics as growth
promoters).
189
See Opinion of the Scientific Comm. for Animal Nutrition on the Immediate and
Longer-term Risk to the Value of Streptogramins in Human Medicine Posed by the Use of
Virginiamycin as an Animal Growth Promoter (July 10, 1998), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/scan/out14_en.print.html
(concluding
that
virginiamycin as a growth promoter does not present an immediate public health
risk); Rep. of the Scientific Comm. for Animal Nutrition on the Use of Avilamycin in
Feedingstuffs for Turkeys for Fattening, at 6 (Oct. 24, 1997), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/oldcomm6/antibiotics/52_en.pdf (finding that
the use of avilamycin for fattening turkeys is acceptable).
190
See Opinion of the Scientific Steering Comm. on Antimicrobial Resistance, at 75–
76 (May 28, 1999), available at http://ec.europa.eu/food/fs/sc/ssc/out50_en.pdf
(concluding that immediate efforts must be taken to reduce the overall use of
antimicrobials). It is worth noting that there continues to be a lively debate in
scientific circles over whether the ban is justified and whether it is helpful or
harmful to human health. See, e.g., Peter Collignon, Antibiotic Growth Promoters, 54
J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 272, 272 (2004) (highlighting the dangers of
using antibiotics as growth promoters); Ian Phillips et al., Does the Use of
Antibiotics in Food Animals Pose a Risk to Human Health? A Critical Review of
Published Data, 53 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 28, 28 (2004) (acknowledging
the possible harm of antibiotics on humans while demonstrating that the actual
danger is small); John Turnidge, Antibiotic Use in Animals—Prejudices, Perceptions,
and Realities, 53 J. ANTIMICROBIAL CHEMOTHERAPY 26, 27 (2004) (discussing the need
to control the spread of resistant bacteria).
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to evaluate each premise.191 The source of Pfizer’s argument,
however, was the initial reports from SCAN.
Of course,
disagreements over key scientific premises also form the crux of
other important international debates, such as carbon emissions
and global warming.
While the potential for doctrinal paradoxes due to judgments
about scientific information is present in domestic courts, the
harms are magnified at the international level. As scholars like
Andrew Guzman have argued, the topics at the heart of scientific
disputes are also at the core of any government’s obligations—
protecting the health and safety of its citizens.192 The impact is
then not only that the process of making scientific decisions during
international adjudication is likely to produce divergent judgments
that could lead to the doctrinal paradox, but also that governments
will face domestic pressures to not comply with international
decisions based on uncertain scientific judgments.193
As
international courts pass judgment on an increasing number of
disputes based on scientific evidence, judgment aggregation
problems could lead to controversial judgments that threaten the
logical coherence of international law and diminish the legitimacy
of their associated organizations because litigants feel that the
scientific uncertainty provides even more political cover than usual
to ignore the court’s decision.
4.4. International Investment Arbitration
Another corner of international adjudication where the
conditions are present for the doctrinal paradox to create
indeterminate decisions is international arbitration. This growing
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Case T-70/99, Alpharma Inc. v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3506 (stating the
need for risk assessment of food additives before implementing bans while
upholding the ban on bacitracin zinc); Case T-13/99, Pfizer Animal Health SA v.
Council, 2002 E.C.R. II-3318 (rejecting Pfizer’s arguments criticizing the Council’s
risk assessment and upholding the ban on virginiamycin).
192
See Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: Health and Safety at the WTO, 45 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1, 26 (2004) (“[T]he regulation of health and safety goes to the heart of
national sovereignty.”).
193
Id. at 10–11 (arguing in the case of WTO decisions regarding a treaty
which allows states to adopt trade restrictions to protect plant, animal or human
life, “[l]osing defendants will face strong pressures to resist compliance, making it
more likely that a dispute will lead to a long-term standoff in which the losing
defendant retains the measure and the winning complainant suspends
concessions in response.”).
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field of international law has been undergoing major
transformations as new subject matters are covered by an
increasing array of permanent arbitration panels.
The
developments have not only changed the face of commercial
arbitration, but also opened the door to the possibility of the
doctrinal paradox occurring in a situation where the judges are
poorly equipped to resolve an indeterminate decision.194
This threat is a relatively recent development because the
structure of traditional international arbitration previously made
the occurrence of the kind of splits in judgment that would lead to
the doctrinal paradox all but impossible.195
Traditionally,
international arbitration took place by having each party to the
dispute appointing a president (the third member of the panel),
who would “enjoy a natural leadership which allows them to exert
a dominant influence on co-arbitrators and bring them over to
support the award.”196 The result was that dissenting opinions
issued in international arbitration were rare.197 Instead, even if
there was a true disagreement, the members of the panel would
still draft a unanimous decision that tried to grapple with the
troubling issues.198 The impact is that the traditional result of an
international arbitration was that the president of the panel was
largely able to get his or her way without having to grapple with
discrepancies in the reasoning of the members of the panels.
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For an excellent discussion of the reasons that international arbitrators
should begin to pay attention to the doctrinal paradox, see Manuel Conthe,
Majority Decision in Complex Arbitration Cases: The Role of Issue-By-Issue Voting
(2010),
http://www.josemigueljudice-arbitration.com/xms/files/02_TEXTOS_
ARBITRAGEM/01_Doutrina_ScolarsTexts/awards/Majority_decisions_and_issu
e-by-issue_voting.pdf (examining how a final decision can be affected by the way
voting is organized within the decision-making body).
195
For background on international arbitration in the investment treaty
arbitration context, see generally GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY
ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007) (exploring “the recently emerged system of
investment treaty arbitration”).
196
Conthe, supra note 194, at 9.
197
See, e.g., Peter J. Rees & Patrick Rohn, Dissenting Opinions: Can they Fulfil a
Beneficial Role?, 25 ARB. INT’L 329, 329–30 (2009) (claiming that the prevailing view
is that dissenting opinions should be discouraged).
198
See Alan Redfern, The 2003 Freshfields—Lecture Dissenting Opinions in
International Commercial Arbitration: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 20 ARB. INT’L
223, 224 (2004) (noting that historically “[t]he expectation is that th[e] award will
be unanimous”).
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Over time, however, there has been an evolution in
international arbitration that has opened the door to the possibility
of decisions that result in voting patterns by tribunal members that
are open to the possibility of indeterminate decisions. The primary
development that has helped pave the way for the possibility of
the doctrinal paradox is that there has been a move towards
allowing dissenting opinions in international arbitration.199 This
development has sparked a debate in the international arbitration
community.200 On the one hand, advocates have argued that
allowing dissenting opinions forces the majority to take greater
pains to craft carefully reasoned opinions that grapple with the
tough questions raised by the dispute.201 Others have argued that
the move to allow dissenting opinions has produced little value
while creating a new avenue for arbitrators—who hope to be
appointed to panels in the future—to grandstand.202 Regardless of
the merits of the decision to allow dissenting opinions, this move
has paved the way for the possibility of the doctrinal paradox
occurring during the course of international arbitration.
One forum that perhaps exemplifies the change in policies that
have left the door open to the possibility of paradoxical voting
patterns is the International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes (“ICSID”). ICSID is an arm of the World Bank which was
established to provide a forum for the resolution of international
investment disputes between a state party to the ICSID Convention
and a national of another state party.203 The rules governing ICSID
create the conditions necessary to facilitate the doctrinal


199

For a discussion of the historical development of the decision to allow
dissenting opinions in international arbitration, see id. at 225 (“Dissenting
opinions have come to international commercial arbitration as a gift of the
common law.”).
200
See generally Albert Jan van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by PartyAppointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS
ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 821 (Mahnoush H.
Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010).
201
See Richard M. Mosk & Tom Ginsburg, Dissenting Opinions in International
Arbitration, 15 MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP. 26, 30 (2000) (“[A] well-reasoned dissent
can help ensure that the majority opinion deals with the most difficult issues
confronting it.”).
202
See Redfern, supra note 198, at 225 (“It is doubtful, however, whether the
dissenting opinion has added much, if anything, of value to the arbitral process.”).
203
See Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States art. 1(2), opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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paradox.204 Specifically, the rules governing ICSID formally
require that the panel publish a written opinion explaining the
reasoning for each of the issues submitted to the panel, and not just
a ruling on the overall judgment of the court.205 Additionally,
arbitrators on ICSID panels have the explicit right to file a
dissenting opinion to express their reasoning or thoughts on any
aspect of the ruling.206 Although these conditions have not led to
an observed example of the doctrinal paradox occurring in any of
ICSID’s published decisions, in at least one case there were shifting
majorities on the different issues decided. In Duke Energy
International v. Peru,207 two members of the panel filed partial
dissenting opinions in which they each suggested one of the key
issues in the case on which they disagreed with the majority.
Moreover, in the dissenting opinions, the arbitrators were clear
that they disagreed with aspects of the reasoning that led to the
conclusion of the panel.208 The implication is that even if an
observed or unobserved instance of the doctrinal paradox has not
yet occurred, it is clear that all of the conditions are present and
that arbitrators are willing to act in the way that makes it possible.
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See CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 830–
34 (2d ed. 2009) (discussing the evolution of the decision to allow dissents from
ICSID decisions).
205
See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Rules of
Procedure for Arbitration Proceedings (Arbitration Rules), Rule 47(1)(i), Apr. 10,
2006, https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/StaticFiles/basicdoc/partF-chap06.htm
(providing that an ICSID award shall be written and contain “the decision of the
Tribunal on every question submitted to it, together with the reasons upon which
the decision is based . . . .”).
206
See id. Rule 47(3) (“Any member of the Tribunal may attach his individual
opinion to the award, whether he dissents from the majority or not, or a statement
of his dissent.”).
207
See Duke Energy Int’l Peru Invs. No. 1, Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/28, Award, ¶ 141 (Aug. 18, 2008), 15 ICSID Rep. 100 (2010),
available
at
http://italaw.com/documents/DukeEnergyPeruAward_000.pdf
(identifying depreciation assessment and merger revaluation assessment as two
key issues discussed by the tribunal).
208
See Duke v. Peru, 15 ICSID Rep. (partial dissenting opinion of Arbitrator
Dr. Guido Santiago Tawil), ¶ 1, available at http://italaw.com/documents/
DukeEnergyPeruAward_000.pdf (“I have concurred with my distinguished
colleagues and fellow arbitrators in most of the issues discussed in the Award.
Unfortunately, I am unable to join in their conclusions on two issues . . . .”); see
also Duke v. Peru, 15 ICSID Rep. (partial dissenting opinion of Arbitrator Dr. Pedro
Nikken),
¶
1–3,
available
at
http://italaw.com/documents/
DukeEnergyPeruAward_000.pdf (expressing his agreement with aspects of the
majority reasoning, but dissenting on the estoppel issue related to the merger).
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5.

RESOLVING THE PARADOX IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION

We have argued that not only do features of international
adjudication make the doctrinal paradox possible while potentially
magnifying its impact, but also that there are a number of growing
areas of international law where this dilemma may surface. The
question then becomes how the problem should be resolved.
Unfortunately, there are no easy answers. As we previously
discussed in Section 2.4, there are tradeoffs associated with all
approaches to judgment aggregation—issue-based voting,
outcome-based voting, flexible approaches, or context-specific
rules that incorporate both issue and outcome voting. Flexible
approaches give courts the freedom to consider the specifics of
individual cases, but in so doing, create indeterminacy and the
potential for accusations of unfairness. Fixed-strategy approaches,
on the other hand, may be less subject to cries of unfairness, but
they force the court into decisions that may not be in its overall
interest. The stakes associated with these tradeoffs are particularly
acute in international settings because courts must balance two
crucial requirements: maintaining support of the states subject to
their jurisdiction and producing logically sound and justifiable
decisions. As a result, analyzing the consequences of these
tradeoffs for international adjudication is a worthwhile endeavor.
To do so, this Section proceeds in four parts, each of which
considers the pros and cons of one of the possible approaches to
addressing the doctrinal paradox. First, we discuss the advantages
and drawbacks of maintaining maximally flexible policies, which
allow international courts to exercise full discretion in disposing of
cases as they arise. This approach has the clear benefit of allowing
the court to decide the best disposition for an individual case given
the particular divergent views of the judges, but does so at the
expense of consistency. Second, we consider the virtues of the
context-specific voting rules that have been proposed in the past.
These policies create procedures for addressing the paradox, but
give judges the opportunity to select between different judgment
aggregation methods depending on the circumstances. Third, we
consider the impact of a fixed policy that employs issue-based
voting. Of particular salience for international law is that this
method often creates more logically consistent precedent, but it
may also drain judicial resources and introduce avenues for
politicking into the decision-making process. Fourth, we consider
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the problems associated with relying on outcome-based voting in
international settings. Since the major problem that has been
identified with this method in domestic settings is that it creates
less intelligible precedent, these concerns have particular force
given that the corpus of international law is still in its infancy. As
we hope to show, each of these four approaches has both
advantages and disadvantages that should be carefully weighed by
those establishing judicial procedures to confront the problems
identified by judgment aggregation theory.
5.1. Flexible Aggregation Procedures in International Adjudication
One obvious approach that international courts and tribunals
could take to respond to the doctrinal paradox is to implement a
policy that gives judges maximal flexibility over how to aggregate
judgments in any given situation. This means that the court would
have several options to consider in cases where the distribution of
votes resulted in the doctrinal paradox. One option is that the
court could elect to use either issue-based or outcome-based voting
to resolve the case, deciding the final outcome based on the
method that they select. Alternatively, the court could choose to
hide the occurrence of the doctrinal paradox either by having
judges change their votes—as Justice White chose to do in Union
Gas and Justice Kennedy chose to do in Fulminante209—or by
publishing a decision that was not sufficiently detailed to make the
occurrence of the doctrinal paradox clear. This policy, whether
explicit or implicit, would ensure that the judges and arbitrators on
international courts and tribunals would have complete freedom to
decide how to confront the unique circumstances of each case that
comes before them.
This flexible approach, which is likely the status quo for many
international legal institutions, presents several clear advantages.
The first, and perhaps most important, is that by not having a set
policy in advance, the judges have the flexibility to decide each
case in the way that they think will best avoid hurting the
legitimacy or long-term health of the court on which they serve.210


209

See supra text accompanying notes 51–56 (discussing the increase of a
doctrinal paradox in U.S. Supreme Court decisions).
210
See Ginsburg, supra note 135, at 668 (“[S]trategic constraints, though less
apparent in the international context than in domestic lawmaking, provide
important limits on judicial discretion.”).
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Recall that the doctrinal paradox, even in domestic settings, makes
a single, logically justified result impossible, which can be
“embarrassing” for the court.211 In international settings, however,
the problem goes deeper than mere embarrassment. When judges
issue decisions that states view as unfavorable or unjustifiable, it
may result in the court being utilized less in the future.212
One form of decision that litigants before international courts
may find particularly troubling is if the court chooses to aggregate
their votes in a way that leads a party to lose, when an alternative
aggregation method would have led that same party to win.
Furthermore, courts have additional incentives to make sure that, if
there are “close calls,” they do not rule against powerful states
with strong interests at stake in the case.213 As a result, the judges
serving on international courts may have good reasons to either
alter the voting to mask the doctrinal paradox, or alternatively, to
aggregate the votes in a way that ensures the interests of powerful
states are respected. Having a flexible judgment aggregation
policy that leaves voting up to the judges makes this possible.
Another advantage of maintaining the status quo—of a flexible
strategy—is that it is the only approach that does not require
expending energy that could otherwise be directed toward other
important international judicial reforms. As the volume of cases
brought before international judicial bodies has increased in recent
years, there has been an attendant increase in pressure to make
reforms. For example, scholars have argued for the need to reform
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See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 34 (“The embarrassment is
entirely the court’s: the divergence between reasons and outcome does not
impugn the soundness of any specific judge’s decision.”); Rogers, supra note 9, at
1013 (“Of course it may be embarrassing to the law that we have a rule that no
individual reasoner could arrive at.”).
212
See Posner & Yoo, supra note 77, at 21 (“In short, arbitrators or judges have
an incentive to rule within the range of outcomes acceptable to the states—in
other words, acting according to their instructions or according to the ex ante
boundaries of cooperation—because such decisions make it more likely that they
will be used again.”).
213
See, e.g., Geoffrey Garrett & Barry R. Weingast, Ideas, Interests, and
Institutions: Constructing the European Community’s Internal Market, in IDEAS AND
FOREIGN POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS, AND POLITICAL CHANGE, 173, 199–203
(Judith Goldstein & Robert O. Keohane eds., 1993) (arguing that the structure of
the ECJ discourages it from issuing decisions that would not have widespread
European Community support); see also id. at 62 n.239, 66 n.267 (discussing the
incentives that ECJ judges have to not to deviate from strong preferences of
powerful member states because the judges have renewable terms).
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prominent international courts such as the ECtHR and the ICJ so
that the courts can best cope with their increasing dockets.214 Since
it can be difficult to make even uncontroversial reforms to
international institutions, the process of reforming international
courts and tribunals may require considerable time and effort. As
a result, leaving flexible procedures in place that allow judges to
decide how to best aggregate votes in each individual case might
be an especially appealing solution because it does not require
expending capital on selecting and implementing a new strategy
that could otherwise be directed to other judicial reform projects.
Of course, as we have described in the foregoing Sections,
maintaining a flexible strategy does have associated costs that
should be of concern to international judicial bodies. Paramount
among these is the risk of creating decisions that will be perceived
as illegitimate. Without an aggregation rule established in
advance, judges have yet another avenue allowing them to act
politically.
And, as previously mentioned, in international
settings, the incentive for judges to act politically when there are
two justifiable outcomes is only magnified. Although all of the
judges on formally independent international courts are
independent, there is evidence to suggest that the judges are
responsive to the needs of the states that appointed them in order
to secure reappointment or future career opportunities.215
The impact of this bias is twofold. First, even in the absence of
explicit evidence, the perception of bias calls into question the
validity and impartiality of decisions that are issued by
international courts when the doctrinal paradox is observed.


214

See, e.g., Helfer, supra note 168, at 126 (arguing that reform of the ECtHR is
needed because “the EC[t]HR is becoming a victim of its own success and now
faces a docket crisis of massive proportions”); see also Cecily Rose, Questioning the
Silence of the Bench: Reflections on Oral Proceedings at the International Court of Justice,
18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 47 (2008) (making the case for the need to reform the
way that oral argument is conducted at the ICJ).
215
See Roland Vaubel, Principal-Agent Problems in International Organizations, 1
REV. INT’L. ORG. 125, 133 (2006) (“If the supervisory institution is a court, its
members are supposed to be independent once they have been appointed. This
means that they should not take instructions from the governments which have
nominated them. However, if the judges may be reappointed . . . they may still be
subservient to the government of their country.”); see also Posner & de Figueiredo,
supra note 107, at 601 (discussing judges’ partiality in favor of their home state in
judicial decision making); Voeten, supra note 79, at 417 (noting that judges are
partial to their national governments when the government is a party in a dispute
before the judge’s court).
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Second, even when the doctrinal paradox is not observed, knowing
that the judges do not have a fixed method of aggregation suggests
that there is negotiation occurring behind the scenes. Therefore,
while maintaining complete flexibility has its advantages,216 the
risks associated with this strategy at the international level may
outweigh the advantages for doing so.
5.2. Context-Sensitive Voting in International Adjudication
Another strategy that international adjudicatory bodies could
adopt to address the doctrinal paradox is a context-specific method
that changes based on the circumstances of the case.217 The
difference between a completely flexible system, as described in
Section 5.1 above, and a context-specific judgment aggregation
method is that the latter imposes a fixed way to determine whether
issue-based or outcome-based voting will be used in any given
case. In other words, a court may employ both outcome- and
issue-based voting, but it would have a fixed policy in place that
dictated which method to use each time the judges encountered the
doctrinal paradox through a majority vote.
The first context-specific strategy that was suggested in the
literature was the proposal for a “meta-vote” put forward by
Kornhauser & Sager.218 Under their proposal, when a paradoxical
voting result occurred, the judges on multi-member courts would
take the time to “deliberate about the appropriate collegial action
to take in the case before them . . . .”219 After doing so, the judges
would then vote on how the judgment in the case should be
aggregated. In addition to holding a meta-vote, Kornhauser &
Sager argued that the judges should then take the additional step
of “proffer[ing] an opinion or several opinions justifying their
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See generally Andrew T. Guzman, The Design of International Agreements, 16
EUR. J. INT’L L. 579 (2005) (arguing that certain design elements in treaties such as
dispute resolution mechanisms increase the costs of non-compliance, and thus
states have rational reasons to not include these elements in order to make it
easier to violate the treaties when non-compliance is in their interests).
217
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17 (explaining the Condorcet paradox
and failing assumptions in ranking preferences within a group); Nash, supra note
43.
218
See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 17, at 30 (discussing judges’ use of
both outcome- and issue-based voting and using the meta-vote as a method of
tabulating and documenting these judicial decisions).
219
Id.
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meta-vote.”220 According to Kornhauser & Sager, there are several
advantages to this procedure. Perhaps the most distinctive is that
by drafting decisions justifying the meta-vote, the court could
begin to develop jurisprudence on how votes should be aggregated
in different circumstances.221 Additionally, this strategy would
ensure that courts are not boxed into one judgment aggregation
mechanism when it may not lead to the best outcome in all
circumstances.222 Furthermore, it would allow courts to learn from
the experiences of other judicial bodies.223
However, this strategy also has several drawbacks in
international settings. First, if judges were forced to take a metavote that would later be publically disclosed as part of the decision,
they may feel even greater political pressure to not cast a vote that
crosses the interests of the powerful states.224
Second, by
attempting to articulate justifications for the judgment aggregation
method used, the court might appear less principled than if it had
a fixed aggregation rule or if it had simply made a decision behind
the scenes.
A second type of context-specific voting procedure has been
proposed by Jonathan Remy Nash.225 Nash proposed a complex
hybrid system that lays out specific criteria for when issue-based
and outcome-based voting should be used.226 A very simplified
take of Nash’s complex proposal is that pure issues of law would
be decided by outcome-based voting, while pure issues of fact
would be decided by issue-based voting.227 The purported benefit
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Id.
See id. at 32 (observing how the meta-vote makes “possible the
development of a systematic, reflective jurisprudence of collective judicial
action”).
222
See id (noting how a meta-vote might offer a procedure for choosing
among different protocols).
223
See, e.g., Jonathan J. Charney, The Impact on the International Legal System of
the Growth of International Courts and Tribunals, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 697, 700
(1999) (noting that after experimentation has occurred in different international
courts, “one would expect that the best ideas will be adopted widely”).
224
See Ginsburg, supra note 135 (discussing the influence that relatively
powerful states possess in international courts).
225
See Nash, supra note 43.
226
See id. at 146–58. For a simplified explanation of Nash’s proposal, see
Meyerson, supra note 43, at 77.
227
See Nash, supra note 43, at 158–59 (“The substantive portion of the
proposal would employ outcome-based voting to resolve pure questions of law
and issue-based voting to resolve other questions.”).
221
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of establishing this kind of complex policy is that it does not
require the court to revisit the question of which judgment
aggregation method to use each time the doctrinal paradox occurs
while still incorporating the advantages of both issue- and
outcome-based voting.228
Like the meta-vote, a complex context-specific voting protocol
like the one proposed by Nash would have several negative
consequences if an international court or tribunal employed it. The
first is a result of the fact that the procedures of international courts
are still in their early stages of development,229 so policymakers
may not have the knowledge necessary to craft a complex decision
that would effectively minimize the potentially harmful effects of
the doctrinal paradox. An additional drawback is that this type of
decision rule does not exist at all in domestic courts.230 If
international courts were to adopt a policy that is dramatically
different than those found in domestic institutions, it may only
serve to increase the perception that international courts and law
are strange and unnecessarily bureaucratic.
5.3. Issue-Based Voting in International Adjudication
As discussed in Section 2.4, there are a number of major
drawbacks associated with issue-based voting as a way of
resolving the doctrinal paradox. Of these potential drawbacks, at
least four are intensified in international settings.
First, the primary argument that is leveled against issue-based
judgment aggregation is that it adds a level of complexity by
making judges debate and decide which issues are the critical ones
that must be decided to resolve the case. Because almost all cases
involve a range of substantive issues, choosing the critical
component issues to vote on makes deciding a case that much
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See infra Sections 5.3 and 5.4 (discussing the advantages and drawbacks of
issue-based and outcome-based voting).
229
See supra text accompanying note 127 (noting that a majority of present
day international courts are still in the beginning of their maturation).
230
See Nash, supra note 43, at 147 (“[E]ven if outcome-based voting is not the
product of natural evolution, it is nonetheless unquestionably the dominant
protocol today; again, the fact that certain exceptions persist suggests that those
exceptions ought presumptively to be retained.”). We cannot find any evidence of
a court adopting a complex decision rule like the one that Nash outlines.
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more difficult.231 Furthermore, because this method of judgment
aggregation necessitates voting on the component issues to
determine the outcome, judges may advocate voting on specific
issues in order to manipulate the ultimate outcome in favor of their
own beliefs. Although there will always be a certain amount of
politicking that goes on behind the scenes in any court, it may not
be wise to intentionally introduce a procedure into international
adjudicatory bodies that creates incentives for gamesmanship.
Since judges serve short terms and are reappointed by their
government, there are already incentives in place for these judges
to act strategically. Introducing an explicit avenue for political
maneuvering will negatively impact the perception (and perhaps
the reality) that international judicial bodies are acting consistently
and fairly.
Second, deciding what component issues that the court should
vote on is even more difficult in the absence of clearly established
precedent. In domestic legal cases, there are often explicit
doctrinal tests that have been established through prior decisions
by the same court or higher courts. Even when such tests do exist,
there is still room for negotiation over what component issues the
court should decide.
Without clear precedent, however,
identifying and agreeing on the salient issues is even more
difficult. Unsurprisingly, international tribunals are likely to be
dealing in areas of law without clearly established doctrine or tests
for resolving legal issues. As compared to domestic judges,
international judges will have to debate more frequently which
tests to create. As a result, international adjudicatory bodies will
find it more difficult to engage in issue-based voting than domestic
courts. Worse yet, the precedent and legal tests created through
issue-based voting may not be sufficiently parsimonious because
the tests were originally devised for strategic, and not purely legal,
reasons.
Third, issue-based voting consumes a greater amount of
judicial resources than other strategies because it requires an extra
round of bargaining to select the salient component issues, and
then requires every judge to think through their opinion on issues
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See Rogers, supra note 9, at 1002 (“When voting by outcome, individual
justices decide what issues they deem to be relevant or dispositive, but when all
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that are not essential to the resolution of the case.232 The result is
that it simply takes more time and resources to resolve an
individual case with issue-based voting. Although it is true that
there are a number of international courts that are serially underutilized by the parties that establish them, it is still an inescapable
fact that one major weakness of existing international courts and
tribunals is that they expend too many resources to decide cases. It
seems particularly unwise for international courts and tribunals to
adopt a practice that is more resource intensive if there is another
logically justifiable strategy available. This course of action makes
the court vulnerable to criticism and may make member states
disinclined to provide resources in the future.
Finally, issue-based voting goes against standard judicial
practice.233 Courts have always traditionally voted on the outcome
of the case, not on component issues, and the potential of a few
aberrant decisions should not be enough to cause courts and
tribunals to jettison this traditional feature of adjudication. Since
there are not any examples of domestic legal systems utilizing
issue-based voting234 it may be particularly unwise for
international law to do so. Adopting a procedure that runs counter
to the legal norms of the member states is likely to increase the
perception that international law is novel in undesirable ways,
which jeopardizes the international legal project.
5.4. Outcome-Based Voting in International Adjudication
Alas, the shortcomings of the strategies discussed above should
not be interpreted as counseling in favor of outcome-based voting.
As with issue-based voting, there are at least two acknowledged
criticisms of outcome-based voting that would be especially
nefarious in international contexts.
The most common argument against outcome-based voting is
that it creates logically inconsistent precedent, which is
problematic when it comes to resolving future cases with the same
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See Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 758
(contending that “judicial economy” is a frequent criticism of issue-based voting).
233
See Rogers, supra note 9, at 1006 (noting that the practice of outcome
voting is “almost universal”); see also Nash, supra note 43, at 77 (explaining that
“judges in [America] have traditionally adhered to outcome-based voting”).
234
See supra text accompanying notes 51–56 (explaining that many domestic
courts have chosen not to vote on every part of the case).
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issues.235 The thrust of this concern is that when outcome-based
voting is used to decide a case with a doctrinal paradox, it will be
unclear to future courts how they can apply the precedent since the
reasoning and outcome of the case will cut in different directions.
This is of particular importance because a range of actors, from
lower courts to bureaucrats, often must try to comply with this
unclear precedent.236 The coherence of international law is
especially important to the development of the international legal
system.237 The purpose of international law is not just to create
precedent for use in future cases, but also to flesh out the body of
international law so that states, international actors, and
individuals can be guided by the courts to determine what is
required of them. If the international law that is produced by
courts is logically inconsistent, it will be an unhelpful guide to
states and actors who are seeking to understand what international
law is and what compliance looks like.
Second, another complaint against outcome-based voting is
that it creates less usable precedent. This is because judges are able
to not discuss or decide issues that were not essential to their
reasoning on a particular issue.238 The impact is that courts pass on
the opportunity to create law that would help make it easier to
interpret the law and increase the ease with which it would be
possible to predict the future actions of the judiciary. In the
international setting, the decision to pass on important issues may
come at an even higher cost than for domestic courts.
Although the ECtHR has an incredibly active docket, there are
many international courts that have very few opportunities to
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See Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 761
(arguing that outcome voting suffers from fundamental flaws and is
systematically incoherent).
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See Nash, supra note 43, at 99 (“An appellate court that resolves a
paradoxical case using outcome-based voting fails to give clear guidance as to the
nature of its holding. This ‘guidance problem’ affects later courts that try to
follow the paradoxical case as precedent, the lower court to which the appellate
court remands the case for further proceedings, and legislative and administrative
bodies.”).
237
Charney, supra note 223, at 707 (1999) (arguing that an important part of a
useful and peaceful international legal system is coherence in international law).
238
See Post & Salop, Rowing Against the Tidewater, supra note 43, at 759
(“[U]sable precedent is another important output of the system, and, precisely
because outcome-voting allows judges to decline to reach certain issues presented
in individual cases, a far greater number of plurality opinions lacking the full
force of law will be produced.”).
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address important international legal issues. This is often because
it is difficult for parties to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts, and
not because there are no disputes occurring. As a result, it may be
a missed opportunity for courts, endowed with time and resources
but few opportunities to employ outcome-based voting when
doing so decreases the amount of usable precedent the court will
create. Although this argument might not be persuasive for
overworked domestic courts that are under a constant docket
crunch, there are international courts for which taking the time to
debate and decide all of the relevant issues presented by a case and
formally voting on each one may be worthwhile because it will
make a valuable contribution to the evolution of international law.
6.

CONCLUSION

From limited resources to low rates of compliance,
international courts and tribunals face a staggering array of
problems, and those who believe in the value of using law to
resolve transnational disputes have been fighting tirelessly to find
solutions. It has not been our intention to heap another problem
onto the pile. Instead, it has been our hope that by discussing the
relevance of judgment aggregation theory and the doctrinal
paradox to international law, we have illustrated the inherent
problem of viewing international courts as singular, rational agents
while also shedding light on one source of indeterminacy in
transnational adjudication that has received little attention. As
international law becomes more complex and transnational
adjudication more common, the fractured decisions that lead to the
occurrence of the doctrinal paradox will become all the more
common. As a result, it is our hope to launch a discussion of how
international courts should aggregate their judgments to ensure
both fairness to litigants and the orderly development of
international law. Hopefully, anyone who believes in logically
sound and procedurally fair adjudication—regardless of the
setting—will see the value of this conversation.



APPENDIX: VOTING PROCEDURES OF PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL COURTS

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

International
Court of
Justice—ICJ
(1946)

Yes (Article 58)
The decision “shall
be read in open
court, due notice
having been given
to the agents.”

Yes
(Article 56)
“The judgment
shall state the
reasons on
which it’s
based.”

Yes
(Article 58)

Yes
(Article 57)
“[A]ny judge shall
be entitled to
deliver a separate
opinion.”

Yes
(Article 55)
“All questions shall
be decided by a
majority of the judges
present.”

European Court
of Justice—ECJ
(1952)

Yes
(Article 37)
“Judgments shall be
signed by the
President and the
Registrar. They shall
be read in open
court.”

Yes
(Article 36)
“Judgments shall
state the reasons
on which they
are based.”

Yes
(Article 37)

Unclear
There is no explicit
ban in the statute,
but there has never
been a dissenting
opinion.

Unclear
There is no mention
of voting.

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

European Court
of Human
Rights—ECtHR
(1959)

Yes
(Rule 78)
“[F]inal judgments
of the Court shall be
published . . . .”

Yes
(Rule 74)
The judgment
will contain
“reasons in point
of law.”

Yes
(Rule 74)

Yes
(Rule 74)
“Any judge . . .
shall be entitled to .
. . a separate
opinion, concurring
with or dissenting
from that
judgment, or a bare
statement of
dissent.”

Yes
(Rule 88)
“Reasoned decisions
and advisory
opinions shall be
given a majority vote
by the Grand
Chamber.”

Inter-American
Court of Human
Rights—IACtHR
(1979)

Yes
(Article 32)
“The Court shall
make public . . . its
judgments, orders,
opinions, and other
decisions . . . .”

Yes
(Article 65)
A judgment
must contain
“legal
arguments” in
addition to the
ruling on the
case.

Yes
(Article 32, 65)

Yes
(Article 32)
“The Court shall
make public . . .
separate opinions,
dissenting or
concurring . . . .”

Yes
(Article 16)
“The decisions of the
Court shall be
adopted by a majority
of the Judges present
at the time of voting.”

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

Andean
Tribunal of
Justice—ATJ
(Court of Justice
of the Andean
Community—
TJAC) (1984)

Unclear

Yes
(Article 76-82)

Yes
(Article 76-82)

No
(Article 76-82)
There is no
mention of a right
to dissent or issue a
separate opinion.

Yes
(Article 23)
Magistrates selected
to write a judgment
based on the majority
opinion.

Court of Justice
of the European
Free Trade
Association
States—EFTA
Court (1992)

Yes
(Article 61, 65)

Yes
(Article 23)
“Every Judge
taking part in the
deliberations
shall state his
opinion and the
reasons for it.”

Yes
(Article 60)

No
(Article 23)

Yes
(Article 23)
“The conclusions
reached by the
majority of the Judges
after final discussion
shall determine the
decision of the
Court.”

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Economic Court
of the
Commonwealth
of
Independent
States—ECCIS
(1993)

Yes
“The chamber can
decide to make
public only the
Resolution of the
decision yet it has to
provide parties with
the complete
decision within 30
days from the
moment of the
public delivery of
the resolution.”

Unclear

No
“The chamber can
decide to make
public only the
Resolution of the
decision yet it has to
provide parties with
the complete
decision within 30
days from the
moment of the
public delivery of
the resolution.”

No
Dissenting
Opinion, not
published
“Dissenting judges
can provide the
Head of the
chamber with their
opinion in
writing.”

Unclear

International
Criminal
Tribunal for the
Former
Yugoslavia—
ICTY (1993)

Yes
(Rule 98 ter)
“The judgement
shall be pronounced
in public . . . .”

Yes
(Rule 98 ter)

Yes
(Rule 98 ter)

Yes
(Rule 98 ter)
“[S]eparate or
dissenting opinions
may be appended.”

Yes
(Rule 98 ter)
“The judgement shall
be rendered by a
majority of the
judges.”

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Central
American Court
of Justice—
CACJ (1994)

Yes
(Article 45)
“The statements
which they shall
formulate to that
effect shall be
written down with a
clear reference to the
respective record, in
a special book called
Book of Votes.”

Yes
(Article 45)

Yes
(Article 45)
“It is the right of the
judges to have the
reasons of their
motions and votes
included in the
record.”

No
(Article 45)
“The judges shall
not formulate any
protest against the
decisions of the
court, or against
the opinions of
their colleagues.”

Yes
(Article 40)

Court of the
Justice of the
Common
Market for
Eastern and
Southern
Africa—
COMESA CJ
(1994)

Yes
(Article 31)
The decision shall be
“deliver[ed] in
public session . . . .”

Yes
(Article 31)

Yes
(Article 31)

No
(Article 31)
“The Court shall
deliver one
judgment only in
respect of every
reference to it . . .”

Yes
(Article 31)
“The judgment of the
Court reached in
private by majority
verdict.”

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Inter-national
Criminal
Tribunal for
Rwanda—ICTR
(1994)

Yes
(Article 22)
The judgement
“shall be delivered
by the Trail
Chamber in public.”

Yes
(Article 22)

Yes
(Article 22)

Yes
(Article 22)
“[S]eparate or
dissenting opinions
may be appended.”

Yes
(Article 22)
“The judgement shall
be rendered by a
majority of the judges
... “

Appellate Body
of the World
Trade Organization—WTO
Appellate Body
(1994)

Yes

Unclear

Unclear

Yes
(Article 3.2)

Yes
(Article 3.2)
“The Appellate Body
and its divisions shall
make every effort to
take their decisions by
consensus. Where,
nevertheless, a
decision cannot be
arrived at by
consensus, the matter
at issue shall be
decided by a majority
vote.”

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

Inter-national
Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea—
ITLOS (1996)

Yes
(Article 125)

Yes
(Article 125)

Yes
(Article 125)

Yes
(Article 125)

Yes
(Article 125)

Caribbean Court
of Justice—CCJ
(2001)

Yes
(Rule 29)

Yes
(Rule 3)

Yes
(Rule 29)

No
(Rule 3)
“No other opinion
or judgment shall
be given or
delivered.”

Yes
(Rule 3)
“The conclusions
reached by the
majority of the Judges
after final deliberation
shall be the decision
or advisory opinion of
the Court...”

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Publish Reasons?

Published
Dissent?

Majority Voting?

Court of Justice
of the East
African Community—EACJ
(2001)

Yes
(Rule 71)

Unclear
(Rule 68)

No
(Rule 68)
“The Court may, in
any particular case,
direct that only the
decision of the
Court and not the
reasons for it shall
be delivered in
Court.”

Yes
(Rule 68)

Yes
(Rule 68)

Economic
Comm-unity of
West African
States Community Court of
Justice—
ECOWAS (2001)

Yes
(Article 61)

Yes
(Article 23)

Yes
(Article 60)

No
(Article 23)

Yes
(Article 23)

Court
(Year Created)

Published
Decisions?

Provide
Reasons?

Publish Reasons?

Inter-national
Criminal
Court—ICC
(2002)

Yes
(Article 74, 50)

Yes
(Article 74)

Yes
(Article 74)

African Court on
Human and
Peoples’
Rights—
ACtHPR (2004)

Yes
(Article 43)

Yes
(Article 43)

Yes
(Article 43)
“All judgments
shall state the
reasons on which
they are based.”

Published
Dissent?
Yes
(Article 74)
“The Trial
Chamber shall
issue one decision.
When there is no
unanimity, the
Trial Chamber’s
decision shall
contain the views
of the majority and
the minority.”
Yes
(Article 44)
“If the judgement
does not represent
in whole or in part
the unanimous
opinion of the
Judges, any Judge
shall be entitled to
deliver a separate
or dissenting
opinion.”

Majority Voting?
Yes
(Article 7)
“The judges shall
attempt to achieve
unanimity in their
decisions, failing
which decisions hall
be taken by a majority
of the judges.”

Yes
(Article 42)

Court
(Year Created)
Southern
African
Development
Community
Tribunal—
SADC Tribunal
(2005)

Published
Decisions?
Yes
(Article 24)
“Decisions of the
Tribunal shall be in
writing and
delivered in open
court . . . .”

Provide
Reasons?
Yes
(Rule 21)
“Every Member
taking part in the
deliberations
shall give his or
her opinion in
writing and the
reasons for it.”

Publish Reasons?
Yes
(Article 24)
“Decisions . . . shall
state the reasons on
which they are
based.”

Published
Dissent?
No
(Rule 21)
“The conclusions
reached by the
majority of the
Members of the
Tribunal after the
final deliberations
shall be the
decisions of the
Tribunal.”

Majority Voting?
Yes
(Article 24)
“Decisions of the
Tribunal shall be
taken by a majority.”

Note: This table presents the policies of permanent international courts that address how the decision
making process will be conducted. This information shows the diversity in the policies that international
courts have in place. It also demonstrates how the formal policies are often sufficiently vague, requiring
that informal procedures be established to determine how judgments will be aggregated and presented.

